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 This thesis analyzes the political-economic determinants of market access – an important 
theoretical indicator of spatial inequality - in the Asia-Pacific region. Political-economic controls such as 
dyadic hostility and sanction costs are specified in a gravity model of trade that is applied to 13 countries 
with respect to their neighboring trade partners. The effects that are yielded from the gravity model are 
used to construct a set of “market access” indices. The theoretical association between market access 
and wages is tested using a full information maximum likelihood estimation and is found to be nearly 
one to one across all but two countries under investigation.  The inclusion of dyadic political-economic 
variables thus improves the explanatory power of market access in determining regional wages. The 
analytic framework presented thus offers practitioners a robust econometric and partial equilibrium 
method to measure the effects of bilateral economic policies on national income differentials. 
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 Part One: General Synthesis 
Introduction 
 According to the IMF, macro-growth economists are observing a persistent decreasing of 
economic inequality between countries (Derviş, 2012). The causes of lessening economic inequality are 
not well known however and continue to be a major point of debate - human capital formation, 
trade/transport costs and technological spatial spillovers have been identified as possible explanations 
to name a few (Ertur, et. al, 2007).  Similarly, the choice of explanatory and endogenous variables for 
measuring economic inequality is indeed also befuddling; economists use a variety of measures for 
identifying economic inequality. The focus of this discussion centers on two such measures put forth by 
economic geographers. One is termed  market potential, which is defined for a given region as the sum 
of all other regional GDPs in a world economy - where each other GDP is weighted by the inverse of its 
distance to the given region (Harris, 1954). The other is termed trade/transport cost, which is a 
composite index of factors that influence the flow of goods over economic space - where economic 
space consists of a set of regions. Throughout this paper I will define a region as a country that is part of 
a broader network of countries through which various types of interactions occur. 
 Market potential has been identified in both theory and empirics as a primary explanation of 
regional wage differentials (Combes, et. al, 2008). The relationship between these two variables is 
explored here empirically with an expression commonly known as the "wage equation". This equation is 
an element of the spatial general equilibrium of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition 
(Fujita, et. al, 1999). Its application here is however rooted in the general equilibrium of the Dixit-Stiglitz 
Krugman model - hereafter referred to as the DSK model. The importance of the DSK model is its 
depiction of labor factors of production as internationally immobile (although intersectorally mobile) 




 trade is completely liberalized, countries with greater labor endowments relative to their trade partners 
can experience relatively increased wage remunerations via a "home market effect" (Leamer, 1995). 
This notion will be explored in a later section. So, while wages are theoretically modeled to allow for 
heterogeneity at equilibrium, the DSK model can also model wage convergence over regions. The key 
driver of the degree of convergence is trade/transport cost. By analyzing the components of trade costs, 
the economist can explore the underlying drivers of economic inequality.  
 This paper seeks to investigate the relationship between wages, trade/transport costs, and 
market potential in an open economy context. I ask: if inequality is indeed decreasing throughout the 
world, is market potential a possible driving factor? To answer this question, one must set-out to 
estimate market potential and then correlate it to wages across a set of countries. The literature shows 
that market potential calculations are principally derived with a measure of trade/transport costs. 
Political determinants of trade/transport costs, such as trade sanctions, are specifically under 
investigation. In theory, a market potential aggregate can be estimated indirectly using trade data. Since 
the structural expressions of these estimations are rooted in both a gravity equation and the DSK wage 
equation, spatial determinants of wages, such as trade/transport costs, are also considered alongside 
market potential. Therefore, trade/transport costs and market potential co-determine interregional 
wage levels. This point will be elaborated upon later. Economic geographers have found that regressions 
of wages on market potential produce coefficients on market potential that can range anywhere 
between 0.25 and 0.60 (Redding, Venables, 2004). The net effect of market potential on wages will 
however be offset by trade/transport costs, which have been found to stand at 170% of the average 
freight-on-board price (Combes, et. al, 2008).  
 A partial equilibrium framework that can be used to test the notions set-forth above is the 




 market potential and trade/transport costs. The most important in this application being the latter. 
Trade economists assert that among the primary driving forces of economic convergence are trade-cost-
reducing trade liberalization policies instituted by national policy makers and supranational technocrats 
(Feenstra, 2007). These forces continue to persist: scholars in the neo-functionalist school of 
international relations identify the increasing of the number of cross-border financial ties and economic 
exchange at the forefront of the Global North's move towards global interdependence. Indeed, national 
and supranational policies are believed to instigate economic convergence via the mechanism of 
increasingly liberalized international trade. This paper quantifies these policies by controlling for 
trade/transport costs. Interestingly however, trade/transport costs can be shown to be composed of 
both policy effects and trade/transport costs, a notion that will be formalized later in this paper. A 
model framework utilizing a time-series panel data-structure is chosen that leads to unique parameter 
estimates across bilateral trade partners instead of generalized parameter estimates that normally fall 
out of regional-cross sectional data-structures.   
 In short, this thesis seeks to utilize trade/transport cost estimates to compute market 
access/market potential measures. These measures should theoretically be positively correlated to 
wages. A non-linear parameterization of the underlying functional form of market access makes it 
possible to analyze the effects of geographic and political-economic policies on market access and 
wages via their composition in the trade/transport cost estimate.  
 
Motivation 
 Motivation for parsing the components of trade/transport costs are twofold. Firstly, a famous 
study by Anderson and Van Wincoop found that the distance elasticity of trade costs stands somewhere 




 "multilateral resistance" - a form of price distortion that is a function of trade costs - little care has been 
taken to incorporate non-geographical variables (such as political economic variables) into gravity in 
order to explain the 0.70 missing effect. Tariff costs have been the focus of this literature although some 
practitioners have run estimations using dummy variables indicating membership to supranational trade 
entities or free trade agreements (Paillacar, 2009). The application I implement in this paper utilizes 
unconventional political economic variables, which I will discuss in subsequent sections. 
 Secondly, Thisse 2008 contends that approximating trade costs with many political and 
geographic variables  cannot possibly be exhaustive (Combes, et. al, 2008). Instead, he argues internal 
trade costs should be included and  considered as a numeraire to external trade costs. In such a model, 
trade/transport cost estimates become relabeled as "freeness of trade" estimates. Nonetheless, these 
measurements may still include political economic variables. It is precisely the inclusion of political 
economic factors alongside geographic ones in the analytic expression for transport/trade costs that 
motivates this application. In doing so, I ask how country-wide wage disparities might be explained by 
political economic factors. These factors will include measures of dyadic hostilities and trade sanction 
costs - both of which are expected to have negative influence. I hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Wages are positively correlated with market access. 
Hypothesis 2: Political economic variables, in particular trade sanction costs and dyadic hostilities, have a 
statistically significant effect on trade levels. Trade sanction costs and dyadic hostilities should have a 





  I test these two hypotheses by utilizing a Gaussian FIML (full-information maximum likelihood) 
estimation strategy proposed by Wymer (Wymer, 2006). This method permits for the estimation of 
structural parameters in a non-linear dynamic framework, which generate heuristics for computing fixed 
costs of labor, α ,and gravity parameters for political-economic variables. I perform this estimation for 
13 countries found in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations +3 (ASEAN+3) and greater Asia-Pacific 
region, including Taiwan (the ROC). Each country's model with respect to each of its 12 associated dyads 
can be considered as a unique model with separate sets of gravity parameter estimates, wage equation 
structural parameters, and production function technology parameters. In short, I find that political 
economic variables are indeed statistically significant and negative determinants of wage levels - in most 
cases. Moreover, the theoretical positive relationship between market access and wages holds for all 
dyads. Lastly, political economic variables, such as trade sanction costs, explain variations in bilateral 
exports. Since political economic effects are also a component of trade/transport costs, these effects 
also affect estimates of a given country's relative market access in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 Before beginning an overview of the underpinning theory of this application, I note that the 
takeaways of this paper need not be confined to the realm of international relations. Analytic 
trade/transport costs can and should be used in applications of the new economic geography (NEG). 
Further research in political economy should utilize trade costs in the spatial general equilibrium posed 
in NEG theory. In so doing, policy makers will be more accurate in predicting the effects of policy 







 Part Two: Theory  
The DSK Model 
 This gravity model is set in the DSK framework,  which requires above all a mechanism for 
spatially asymmetric wage equilibria.  This framework can also be described as a standard new trade 
theory model; albeit one with transport/trade costs and monopolistic competition.  
 We envisage a two-sector economy which requires two factor inputs for production - unskilled 
and skilled labor, denoted 𝐿𝑎  and 𝐿 respectively.  As is the short-run case for the entire family of models 
presented above, labor is assumed to be immobile across any pair of regions r or s but mobile across 
sectors. Since my application considers space at the geographic level of the country, the assumption of 
immobile factors may be reasonable if net migration is negligible between all country pairs r and s.  
 The two sectors in this economy include firstly a formal sector that utilizes a combination of 
unskilled and skilled labor and secondly a residual sector that utilizes only unskilled labor. The inclusion 
of a residual sector is necessary from a mathematical standpoint. Unlike the formal sector, whose 
production is subject to transport costs, the residual sector is assumed to transport its production 
costlessly. Formally, 
𝑝𝑐.𝑖.𝑓. = 𝑝𝑓.𝑜.𝑏. ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑠 
 𝑝𝑐.𝑖.𝑓. represents the "carriage, insurance, and freight" price - otherwise known as the 
"delivered" price that is charged at market. In other words, consumers bear all the costs of 
transportation/trade faced by a given firm in the exporting region. Some authors call this an "ad valorem 
tax". The 𝑝𝑓.𝑜.𝑏. represents the "free on board" (or mill) price, essentially the cost of production.  𝑇𝑟𝑠 = 1 implies 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒, s.t. 𝑇𝑟𝑠 − 1 measures the proportion of output lost in shipping from r 




 𝑇𝑟𝑠 ≥ 1 
 The residual sector thus sells output at spatially symmetric prices. Until beginning a discussion 
on the gravity model, I will present region r as the domestic region consuming exports from region s and 
domestic production from region r.  
 Moreover, it is assumed that the residual sector operates at perfect competition once at 
equilibrium. Bertrand competition occurring under perfect information and perfect competition at the 
sub-regional level ensures that the residual sector exhibits zero-profits such that firms can enjoy free 
entry and exit. Intuitively, a zero-profit condition can be said to hold in the long-run equilibrium, such 
that there is free-entry of firms whenever profits are positive (Feenstra, 2003). Markups due to 
consumer preference for variety are essentially null in the residual sector. Formally, 
 
𝑝𝑟 = 𝛽𝑤1,𝑟𝜌 =  𝛽𝑤𝑟 ∗ ( 𝜎𝜎 − 1) 
 Where 𝛽 represents a variable unskilled labor input cost (Ottaviano, et. al, 2003). 𝜎
𝜎−1
 represents 
the markup, whose derivation will be shown in a subsequent section of this paper. 𝜌 indexes the markup 
and can be interpreted as the "representative consumer's" preference for product varieties. The residual 
sector is modeled as a constant returns sector, which implies that production in this sector faces a 
constant marginal cost. Formally, this means that the residual sector essentially assumes that 𝛽 in the 
labor cost/production equation is equal to 1 such that 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑤𝑟 . This also implies that the marginal 
product of labor, the inverse of the marginal cost, is equal to one. Moreover, since consumption of 
output in the residual sector is not modeled as a CES aggregate index, the expression 𝜎
𝜎−1
 does not enter 
marginal revenues after the demand curve is obtained from utility maximization. This relationship 




 marginal costs of production (in terms of labor and quantity produced) to marginal revenues (in terms of 
consumer demand). It is important to note that for the residual sector, wages are thus uniform over all 
regions and equal to one. In the formal sector, wages are generally given by the following labor demand 
expression: 
𝑤𝑟 = � 𝜇1 − 𝜇� 𝐿𝑟𝐿  
 Here, 𝐿𝑟  is simply the amount of skilled labor in region r (I will formalize this variable more 
shortly) and 𝜇 is the share of region r's expenditures in the formal sector. The key takeaway here is that 
formal sector wages are generally heterogeneous, an important aspect that will be fully developed and 
synthesized into the DSK model. 
 The one-to-one mathematical relationship between a given region's wages and prices that 
emerges from perfect competition and costless transportation has one main benefit: the prices and 
wages of the formal sector can be expressed in terms of the residual sector - this is the notion of the 
residual sector's output being designated as the numeraire good. I now turn to modeling the formal 
sector and present the consumer optimization strategy. 
 
Consumer Optimization 
 I now present the underlying utility structure of the DSK's general equilibrium framework. The 
formal sector is driven by a set of firms 𝛮. 𝛮 is split between some number of regions: a domestic region 
and say an aggregated foreign region. As such we can write this as  𝛮 =  𝛮𝑟 + 𝛮𝑠, where r and s 
correspond to the domestic and foreign regions respectively and 𝛮 is considered to be sufficiently large 




 𝛮 produces a variety of good i. Important to note is that these goods are not perfect substitutes but 
rather varieties of a differentiated good. It is assumed that firms are unique to their respective regions 
and do not produce the same varieties as other firms. In short, firms produce differentiated products. 
 For each region, firms produce their individual varieties under increasing returns, which leads to 
an equilibrium output that is non-region specific and dependent only on consumer preferences (𝜌) and 
production technology (𝛼,𝛽) - the notation here will be presented soon below.  Hence, firms will set 
their prices according to prevailing price indices, which allows for heterogenous wages across regions. 
However, prices and wages have no bearing on equilibrium output levels. There is a prevalence of 
multiple firms in one region, which stands contrary to the modeling approach taken in the New 
Economic Geography (NEG) in which factor inputs and firms are considered mobile in the long-run and 
operating under the pricing mechanisms of monopolistic competition. NEG would assume one firm and 
thus one variety per region for a finite continuum of varieties.  
 Given these sets of firms and their corresponding varieties, we can fashion an expression for 
region r consumption of variety i. In order to obtain this demand curve, we assume that the 
representative consumer consumes a composite good from the formal sector. This good alongside the 
goods consumed from the residual sector are assumed ex-post to maximize the representative 
consumer's utility. Utility is given as Cobb-Douglas with a CES sub-utility aggregate nested in place of 
consumption of the formal sector's output. Generally, the consumer's utility optimization problem is to 
maximize utility derived from consuming products of the formal and residual sector subject to an 
income constraint, i.e. : 
max𝑈𝑟 = 𝑀𝑟𝜇𝐴𝑟1−𝜇   




  𝑌𝑟  represent's regional income. 𝑀𝑟 =  �∫ 𝑞(𝑖)𝜌𝑑𝑖𝑛0 �1/𝜌 which is known as both the subutility 
function and the CES aggregator index for representative consumer's consumption of the formal sector's 
output. Utility preferences are assumed to be convex between choice alternatives, uniform across all 
possible good bundles, and then maximized at ex-ante consumption levels. Here, A represents the 
representative consumer's consumption of the residual sector's output everywhere; 𝑝𝐴 is the price of 
residual output everywhere; 𝜇 is the representative consumer's expenditure share on formal sector 
output; and 𝜌 = [(𝜎 − 1)/𝜎]; and the aggregate price index takes the form: 







 Note that these expressions are given as integrals because it is assumed that all products are 
demanded in the same quantity and all prices are symmetrical at market equilibrium. 𝑃𝑟 will decrease as 
the number of varieties taken in aggregate across regions rises; this dynamic captures the nature of 
competition between brand varieties. The expression here for 𝑃𝑟 falls out of the expenditure 
minimization problem given a budget constraint on representative consumer income 𝑌 that confronts 
an individual variety of consumption choices from the formal sector (Fujita, et. al, 1999). It is defined as 
a continuous density function like the composite sub-utility consumption function so that the number of 
varieties is not treated as an integer. This assumption has important implications that are beyond the 
scope of this paper (Combes, et. al, 2008).  
 Note that for this utility optimization problem, consumers are paying delivered prices for the 
imported good being exported out of the foreign region s. 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties and takes a value 𝜎 > 1 - as in Chamberlinian demand, this parameter remains constant in 
aggregate demand in keeping with the functional form of the CES aggregator, which yields benefits of 




 elasticity of substitution and technology parameters of the increasing returns to scale (IRS) production 
function (Feenstra, 2003). We can index 𝜎 with the expression 1/𝜌 = [𝜎/(1 − 𝜎)] to denote preference 
for variety, where 0 < 𝜌 < 1.  An increase in 𝜎 means that products are becoming more homogenous. 𝜌 
close to 1 suggests that goods are nearly perfect substitutes for each other and as it decreases towards 
0, the desire to consume a greater variety of manufactured goods increases. Krugman notes that the 
reciprocal of 𝜌 is the degree of economies of scale when output is produced at equilibrium by all firms 
across all regions (Krugman, 1991). It can be derived by dividing the marginal product of labor at market 
equilibrium, by the average product of labor at market equilibrium (Krugman, 1991). This expression is 
derived from a general production cost function that exhibits increasing returns to scale. 
 The presence of transportation costs suggests that utility is maximized over a range of goods 
that may either have domestic or foreign origin. Moreover, the presence of CES preferences in both the 
composite consumption and price functions will lead to imperfect competition; and hence, 
"fragmented" (e.g. differentiated) spatial markets in the context of the open economy. This point is 
crucial since firms and production factors are assumed to be interregionally immobile in the short-run 
such that wages and prices equilibrate independently from firm concentration in the presence of 
international trade, which stands contrary to the long-run dynamics posed in NEG. This assumed 
immobility of factors arguably does hold in a short-run equilibrium, but is also convenient from a 
modeling perspective (Combes, et. al, 2008). This assumption is present in the HO model, New Trade 
Theory, and nearly every derivative of these families of models. 
 Maximization of the utility function with respect to the budget constraint less the value of 
aggregate consumption across the two sectors yields total demand of formal sector production variety i 




 standard consumer optimization theory. Formally, constant elasticity of substitution (CES-type) demand 
is given as, 
𝑞𝑟(𝑖) = 𝜇𝑝𝑟(𝑖)−𝜎[𝑃𝑟𝜎−1𝑌𝑟 + 𝜙𝑟𝑠𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝑌𝑠] 
 Notice that the CES aggregator imposed on formal sector product varieties 
𝑀𝑟 =  �∫ 𝑞(𝑖)𝜌𝑑𝑖𝑛0 �1/𝜌 is sufficient for yielding constant elasticity of demand for the consumer. To verify 
this, take the logs of both sides of the demand function in order to transform it into its empirical form: 
−𝜎 becomes the constant coefficient for 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) for all values 𝑞𝑟(𝑖), and −𝜎 is bearing the theoretical 
negative effect. 
 Turning back to the total demand function's components: 𝑌𝑟 = 𝜃𝛽𝐿𝛽 + 𝑤𝑟𝜃𝐿 and 𝑌𝑠 = (1 −
𝜃𝛽)𝐿𝛽 + 𝑤𝑠(1 − 𝜃)𝐿 in which 𝐿𝛽  represents the total mass of unskilled labor across regions r and s and 
𝜃𝛽  represents the share of unskilled workers in region r (Combes, et. al, 2008). The quantity 𝑃𝑟𝜎−1𝑌𝑟 
represents domestic markets and the quantity 𝜙𝑟𝑠𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝑌𝑠 represents foreign markets. The first term will 
nearly always be larger than the second if 𝜙𝑟𝑠  is positive.  𝜙𝑟𝑠  is termed the "spatial discount" factor or 
otherwise sometimes called the "freeness of trade" by trade economists. Freeness of trade is formally 
given as: 
𝜙𝑟𝑠 ≡ 𝑇−(𝜎−1) 
 Clearly, freeness of trade is inversely related with trade costs - as it approaches 0, trade is at 
autarky. I now begin a quick overview of the DSK model's mechanics. DSK is a model of monopolistic 
competition which relies heavily on increasing returns to scale at the firm level and imperfect 
competition. These two elements are the mathematical ingredients necessary for formalizing 




  In closing this subsection, it is worth remarking that other formulations of consumer preferences 
in the representative consumer's utility function have been proposed that lead to much richer demand 
functions. The quasi-linear utility function, which allows for mixed bundles of consumption, is one such 
example (Ottaviano, et. al, 2002). These demand structures allow for different elasticities of substitution 
between pairs of varieties. 
 
Imperfect Competition 
 I now turn away from the consumer problem and approach the producer problem. The DSK 
model requires a formalization of imperfect competition for a number of reasons: imposing constant 
elasticity of substitution on the demand curve and allowing equilibrium regional wages to deviate from 
prices according to a markup; the latter reason here permitting monopolistic pricing. First and foremost, 
monopolistic competition is envisaged in a spatial economy in which each region r contains one 
monopolist who is charging a unique regional price that is a function of revenue and factor costs (e.g. 
wages). The modeler's goal here is to find a way to express prices in terms of their factor costs and 
markup at a profit-maximizing equilibrium -  in other words equating marginal revenues to marginal 
costs. To begin with, one can take a more simplified view of the demand function presented above by 
ignoring the income effect of prices (e.g. compensated demand). Moreover, consider the case when we 
are modeling consumers to be facing f.o.b. prices under a mill-pricing strategy so that we can ignore 
transport/trade costs for goods out-of-region.  Maximizing the representative consumer's utility with 
respect to demand for formal sector output yields the domestic demand component of the total 
demand function (Combes, et. al, 2008): 




  Where 𝑃𝑟 = ∫ [𝑝𝑟𝜌/(𝜌−1)(𝑖)](𝜌−1)/𝜌𝑑𝑖𝑛0  results from an expenditure minimization problem 
(Fujita, et. al, 1999). Note also that the uncompensated consumer demand function for 𝑀𝑟 = �∫ 𝑞(𝑖)𝜌𝑑𝑖𝑛0 �1/𝜌 is equivalent to 𝑀𝑟 =  𝜇𝑌𝑟𝑃𝑟  at utility maximized levels for the representative consumer 
(Donaghy, 2004). Rearranging the terms and solving for the price of variety i, one can obtain the inverse 
demand function for the variety i.   
𝑝𝑟(𝑖) = �𝑃𝑟𝑀𝑟1/𝜎�𝑞𝑟(𝑖)−1/𝜎  
 Here, each firm is assumed to choose its price by taking the price indices as given. 
This expression can be substituted into the firm's profit function: 
𝜋𝑟 = 𝑝𝑟(𝑖)𝑞𝑟(𝑖) −𝑤𝑟(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑞𝑟(𝑖)) 
 The first term is gross revenue and the second term is production costs, when 𝛼 is a fixed skilled 
labor cost (in terms of labor units). Differentiating the profit function with respect to quantity demanded 
of the formal sector output will yield an expression for marginal costs and marginal revenues (Fujita, et. 
al, 1999). Notice that 𝜋𝑟  is generalized over all firms i. This occurs since profit maximization and market 
clearing yields optimal price and production levels that are common to all firms in a given region. Hence, 
producers are now assumed to maximize their profits under nonstrategic behavior, which means that 
they take their regional price index 𝑃𝑟 as constant and exogenous in order to determine their production 
levels (Fujita, et. al, 1999). One typically proceeds by first deriving an expression for optimal price. 
Substituting the inverse demand curve expression into the expression for profit and taking 𝜕𝜋𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑟(𝑖) yields: 
𝜕𝜋𝑟




  Here it could be shown that 𝜎 also equals the price elasticity of demand (Combes, et. al, 2008). 
At the zero profit equilibrium, this implies: 
𝑝𝑟(𝑖) �1 − 1𝜎� = 𝑤𝑟𝛽 
 The left hand side of this equation can be written in its more recognizable form: 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) �(𝜎−1)𝜎 �. 
One then proceeds to derive expressions for marginal cost and marginal revenue. This expression allows 
one to derive the main component of imperfect competition: firms will produce 𝑞𝑟(𝑖) up to the point 
where their marginal costs are equal to their marginal revenues. Marginal revenue is given by 
𝜕[𝑝𝑟(𝑖)𝑞𝑟(𝑖)]
𝜕𝑞𝑟(𝑖) = 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) �1 − 1𝜎� and marginal cost by 𝜕[𝑤𝑟(𝛼+𝛽𝑞𝑟(𝑖))]𝜕𝑞𝑟(𝑖) = 𝑤𝑟𝛽. When MR = MC, 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) = 𝑤𝑟𝛽 
and when prices are optimized, one can obtain once again the zero-profit equilibrium. Hence, imperfect 
competition exists at the level of the individual variety i, and each variety i is assumed to be produced by 
only one spatial monopolist. Firms will only strategically compete in the Bertrandian fashion within their 
own markets but not across markets. This quantity is less than what would otherwise exist under perfect 
competition, which implies that firms will face barriers to entry at the regional level. In other words, 
firms are endowed with a certain regional market and cannot simply produce everywhere as would be 
the case in perfect competition.  
 
Increasing Returns (Scale Economies) 
 Having derived the basis of imperfect competition by deriving an expression of firms' marginal 
revenues, I want to show how imperfect competition manifests itself in terms of the equilibrium price. 
Doing so requires expressing sales prices in terms of production costs. Production cost 𝐶(𝑞𝑟(𝑖)) - the 




 be more formally expressed in a production function exhibiting increasing returns (stated here in terms 
of production value - i.e. cost of production): 
𝑤𝑟�𝛼 + 𝛽𝑞𝑟(𝑖)� = 𝐿(𝑖)𝑟𝑤𝑟 = 𝐶(𝑞𝑟(𝑖)) 
 This function is also equal to 𝑝𝑟(𝑖)𝑞𝑟(𝑖) for some firm i when 𝜋𝑟 = 0 (see the profit function for 
rationale). Worthy to note is the expression for labor which is denoted as 𝐿(𝑖)𝑟 , the labor used by firm  i 
for producing variety i. Output of firm i is given by 𝑞𝑟(𝑖). Marginal costs are given by 𝜕𝐿(𝑖)𝑟𝑤𝑟𝜕𝑞𝑟(𝑖) = 𝑤𝑟𝛽. 
Notice that this function contains fixed skilled and variable unskilled labor costs, otherwise known as 
"technologies", 𝛼 and 𝛽. If 𝛼 ≠ 0 and is positive, then this function will exhibit increasing returns to 
scale. This can be readily seen by dividing the function by 𝑞𝑟(𝑖) to obtain the average cost of production.  
 Factor costs, and thus wages, are at equilibrium when profits are maximized by firms and when 
f.o.b. prices for formal sector goods are set at average costs for producing formal sector goods. Hence, a 
zero-profit condition in the context of imperfect competition implies that price equals average cost of 
production – a major implication that leads to the notion of increasing returns to scale in the production 
function. The former condition makes it feasible for firms to enter into this two-region economic system 
without immediately going bankrupt. The latter condition arises from increasing returns to scale in the 
formal sector and gives rise to conditions for imperfect competition within this sector.   
 Firms will exit if they cannot produce at or below average costs. Setting prices 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) equal to 
average costs 𝐶(𝑞𝑟(𝑖))
𝑞𝑟(𝑖) ,   
𝑝𝑟(𝑖) = 𝑤𝑟𝛼𝑞𝑟(𝑖) + 𝑤𝑟𝛽 
 Firm i will break even if they equate their marginal revenues equal to their marginal costs. Doing 




 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) = � 𝜎(𝜎 − 1)�𝑤𝑟𝛽 
 Note that the markup breaks the pricing rule in perfect competition. This expression can be 
reformulated as a function of transport costs such that, 𝑝𝑟𝑠(𝑖) = � 𝜎(𝜎−1)�𝑇𝑟𝑠𝑤𝑟𝛽, where 𝑇 > 1 (Combes, 
et. al, 2008). 
 Worth also noting here is the condition that equilibrium prices for products i are equivalent 
within regions (Donaghy, 2004). Proceeding with monopolistic pricing, the intersection of average costs 
and marginal costs forms the equilibrium condition for output. Indeed, � 𝜎(𝜎−1)�𝑤𝑟𝛽 = 𝑤𝑟𝛼𝑞𝑟(𝑖) + 𝑤𝑟𝛽 and 
solving for 𝑞𝑟(𝑖) yields 𝑞∗ for some i. Note that if technology parameters are regional specific, 𝑞∗ will 
also be region specific. Formally, 
𝑞∗  = �𝛼
𝛽
� ∗ (𝜎 − 1). 
 Hence, equilibrium optimal output will be uniform across regions (if technologies are regionally 
symmetric) such that profits are zero for all regions. This condition guarantees that free entry and exit 
persists across regional markets. 
 
Necessary Conditions for Trade 
 Since economies are assumed to be open in the DSK framework, trade will feasibly lead to an 
equilibrium outcome across regional prices. The Heckscher-Ohlin model usually requires that the terms 
of trade 𝑃𝑠
𝑃𝑟
 be initially asymmetrical such that relative market sizes 𝑌𝑠
𝑌𝑟
 are as well. If they were not, there 
would be no reason for trade to ensue between the regions (Feenstra, 2003). Once free trade takes 




 of formal sector goods. For example, if 𝐿𝑟 > 𝐿𝑠 such that 𝑁𝑟 > 𝑁𝑠 then region r produces more varieties 
and exhibits 𝑃𝑟 < 𝑃𝑠 for formal sector goods. Consequently, r will export more formal sector goods to s 
than vice versa; region s will demand relatively more (𝑞𝑠(𝑖)) in its demand function's foreign component 
(𝜙𝑟𝑠𝑃𝑟𝜎−1𝑌𝑟) compared to region r's foreign component of demand. Moreover, since 𝑤𝑟 = � 𝜇1−𝜇� 𝐿𝑟𝐿  
wages for formal sector production will be higher in r than in s at the equilibrium world price.  
 Hence, the DSK models wages to converge and diverge according to factors such as 
transport/trade costs. In other words, wages may equilibrate differently across regions depending on 
regional transport/trade costs. Using this theoretical basis, I can now outline a gravity model of trade 
that assumes heterogeneous wages in a bilateral trade setting; a setting in which outputs are assumed 
to be uniformly and optimally produced by firms in a multiregional setting under imperfect competition 
and increasing returns to scale. Firms' "economic base" (e.g. exportable output) make up a portion of 
this equilibrium output and are assumed to face transport/trade costs. The coefficients estimated in this 
gravity model can then be used to construct  𝜙𝑟𝑠 , "market access" and "supply access", all three of 
which are merely components of regional wages. This will be expounded upon shortly below. 
 
The Gravity Model and Market Potential 
 The DSK model permits the economist to formulate a formalized notion of equilibrium wages 
and Venables shows that a theoretical component of the "wage equation" can be estimated in a gravity 
framework. To begin with, one need only consider first the "pricing rule" 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) = � 𝜎(𝜎−1)�𝑤𝑟𝛽, which 
was shown earlier to fall out of equating marginal revenues of the firm to marginal costs of variety i 
production in the firm's profit function, and second the consumer's basic demand function for region r 




 its empirical operationalized form, departs slightly from this form by considering demand expressed in 
terms of  trade flows - specifically internal trade flows and imports from foreign regions. This is a slight 
departure because one is identifying consumption according to product origin. The basic demand 
function can be rewritten to encompass the demand for foreign imports and for internal trade flows 
given by a regional composite 𝑀𝑟𝑠 . Where region r is the exporter and region s is the importer. Hence, 
demand is given from the perspective of the importer, region s where (𝑟, 𝑠) ∈ 𝑁. For the rest of this 
section, I am going to alter the logic of the origin-destination sub-scripts. Instead of the domestic-foreign 
interpretation, rs now denotes exporter first and importer second. Hence, this section presents notation 
that stands in contrast to previous sections in which s was considered an exporter in relation to our 
domestic region, region r.  
 Preferences are thus given for consumers in region s with the following utility function (Redding, 
Venables, 2004): 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑈𝑠 = �𝑀𝑟𝑠𝜇 𝐴𝑠1−𝜇𝑁
𝑟
 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑌𝑠 = 𝑃𝑟𝑀𝑟𝑠 + 𝑝𝐴𝐴 
 𝑌𝑠 is regional income of s and A is that region's consumption of agricultural output. 𝑀𝑟𝑠 = �∫ 𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖)𝜌𝑑𝑖𝑛0 �1/𝜌 and 𝑃𝑟 = �∫ [𝑇𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑟(𝑖)]−(𝜎−1)𝑑𝑖𝑛0 �−1/(𝜎−1).  Here, 𝑁 includes include region s, implying 
that internal (i.e. intraregional) trade is observable and proxies in-place of consumption of domestically 
produced goods.   
 Hence, this utility function is merely a function of trade flows. Note also the summation 
operator across regional composites, which implies that the foreign region r consists of a continuum of 
regions r's. For the rest of this sections' discussion I will focus more on the foreign import component of 
trade flows by ignoring the role of internal flows. Following utility optimization, the demand function 




 demand. Invoking Shephard's Lemma, the amount of the formal sector's good of variety i that is 
produced in r and demanded in s can be written as: 
𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖) = [𝑝𝑟𝑠(𝑖)]−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠  
 They key to interpreting this expression is recognizing that the foreign and domestic 
components of consumer demand for region s have been combined into an expression for production 
originating from region r. Notice that this function is merely an expression for formal production of 
variety i in region r that will be imported by region s. Although we are talking about region s demand, it 
makes more sense to think about this equation from the exporter's perspective, region r. Region s's 
demand here is a function of its GDP, but it is useful to think of this expression as the demand that 
region r's producers face from region s consumers. Where 𝑌𝑠 is aggregate income at location s and 𝜇𝑌𝑠 is 
the share of expenditures on formal sector output of variety i in region s. Hence, the consumer demand 
in s for region r production is a function of region s GDPs. Recall that the mill price at region r 
𝑝𝑟𝑠(𝑖) = 𝑝𝑟(𝑖)𝑇𝑟𝑠  and 𝜙𝑟𝑠 ≡ 𝑇𝑟𝑠−(𝜎−1)  where trade costs are spatially symmetrical (Fujita, et. al, 1999). 
In other words, rs denotes that which is charged in s for region r goods. Hence, mill pricing policies are in 
effect for all varieties produced in country r are sold at their c.i.f. price in country s.  
 Taking into account these transport costs yields an expression for effective demand of variety i 
in region s: 
𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖) = [𝑝𝑟(𝑖)𝑇𝑟𝑠]−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠 
 Here it is assumed that output occurs at full capacity so that production is at optimum levels. 
Again, region s is consuming imports at a c.i.f. price which is yielded by multiplying f.o.b. prices of 
foreign goods 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) by the cost of transporting those goods 𝑇𝑟𝑠. The yielded expression is 𝑝𝑟𝑠(𝑖), the 




  In this next step, I want to derive an expression of region s demand for all products across 𝑁 at 
delivered-price consumption. Since transport costs are iceberg costs, such that 𝑇𝑟𝑠 = 𝑇𝑠𝑟 > 1, one 
expects the f.o.b. price of the exporter to be less than the c.i.f. price at the destination market such that 
𝑝𝑟(𝑖) < 𝑝𝑟𝑠(𝑖) which implies that 𝑞𝑟(𝑖) > 𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖) as region r exports "melt-away" in transit to region s. 
However, this metaphor implies that if consumers in region s are in fact consuming the full quantity of 
region r production intended for region s markets, then 𝑇𝑟𝑠 times 𝑞𝑟(𝑖) exports must be delivered to 
region s so that no output is actually "melted along the way". Hence, under a delivered-price setting in 
which consumers bear the costs of shipping, the true quantity of exports from s to r is given by a 
premium borne to customers 𝑇𝑟𝑠 on top of production such that  𝑇𝑟𝑠𝑞𝑟(𝑖) = 𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖). Succinctly put, since 
effective demand for variety i at region s evaluated with trade costs leads to a quantity consumed ex-
post the arrival of imports that is less then that demanded ex-ante, 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) needs to be multiplied by 𝑇𝑟𝑠, 
given that 𝑇𝑟𝑠 = 𝑇𝑠𝑟  such that trade costs are symmetrical. Hence,  
𝑇𝑟𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖) = [𝑝𝑟𝑠(𝑖)]−𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠  
  Again, 𝑝𝑟𝑠(𝑖) is an expression of the c.i.f. price of region s goods. And the same relationship 
between f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices can be applied to quantities; hence, 𝑇𝑟𝑠𝑞𝑟(𝑖) = 𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖). The left hand side 
can also be rewritten by rearranging the price terms so that: 
𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖)�𝑝𝑟𝑠(𝑖)�𝜎 = [𝑇𝑟𝑠]1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠 
 This form applies to a strictly two region case and is in fact the wage equation for region r. 
Hence, wages of the exporting region are a function of peripheral regions. Let me now simplify for a 







  The subscript rs has been replaced with r for the purposes of expositional simplicity. Note 
however that I still allow (𝑟, 𝑠) ∈ 𝑁. 
 At profit maximizing and market clearing levels, one simply substitutes the equilibrium 
expression for prices into the inverse demand function  𝑝𝑟(𝑖). Recall that the pricing rule states that 
equilibrium prices can be expressed as 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) = 𝑝𝑟 = � 𝜎(𝜎−1)�𝑤�𝑟𝛽 - the RHS is composed of the markup, 
composite costs, and the marginal unskilled labor input requirement respectively. I've rewritten 𝑤𝑟  since 
Venables requires that 𝑤�𝑟  be decomposed into three factor costs: namely, an intermediate input cost 
𝐺𝑟 , wages of immobile factors (i.e. labor) 𝑤𝑟 , and rents of mobile factors (i.e. capital) 𝑣𝑟 . Without any 
loss of generality, each of these costs is aggregated under the assumption of linear homogenous Cobb-
Douglas production technology with cost-input share parameters summing up to one. Formally, 
𝑤�𝑟 = 𝐺𝑟Φ𝑤𝑟Ψ𝑣𝑟Θ where 𝛷 + 𝛹 + 𝛩 = 1. 
 Hence, total exports at profit maximizing levels can be manipulated to be expressed as wages at 
profit maximizing levels.  
𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖) �𝛽 � 𝜎(𝜎 − 1)�𝐺𝑟Φ𝑤𝑟Ψ𝑣𝑟Θ�𝜎 = 𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠  
 Where the foreign component of the CES price index 𝑃𝑠 is calculated with a CES aggregator 
(Leamer, 1995): 





 As a side note, the wage equation presented above can be generalized more extensively for 
imputation into the general spatial equilibrium of an NEG model, though this is not the focus of this 




 equilibrium prices 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) = 𝑝𝑟 = � 𝜎(𝜎−1)�𝑤𝑟𝛽 into 𝑞𝑟(𝑖)(𝑝𝑟)𝜎 = 𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠 and substitute 
equilibrium production 𝑞𝑟 = 𝑞∗  = �𝛼𝛽� ∗ (𝜎 − 1) in a likewise fashion. Rearranging the terms and 
aggregating over all possible trade partners 𝑅 (Donaghy, 2004): 





 One can also look at the producer's side of the problem to gain a better understanding of the 
cost and revenue components. Since at equilibrium 𝑝𝑟(𝑖) = 𝑝𝑟 = 𝛽 � 𝜎(𝜎−1)�𝐺𝑟Φ𝑤𝑟Ψ𝑣𝑟Θ, it is also the 
case that 𝑝𝑟 �
(𝜎−1)
𝜎
� = 𝛽𝑤�𝑟. Substituting this equilibrium expression into the profit function 𝜋𝑟  yields an 
expression of gross profits 𝑝𝑟
𝜎
𝑞𝑟(𝑖) less fixed costs (𝜎 − 1)𝛼.  
𝜋𝑟 = 𝑝𝑟𝜎 [𝑞𝑟(𝑖) − (𝜎 − 1)𝛼] = 0 
 The expression for gross profits becomes useful in frequentist probabilistic models of location 
choice in which firm location decisions are a function of gross profits. This application is outside the 
scope of this paper; however, the regional profit expression here is useful for explaining the role that 
increasing returns will have in inducing agglomeration. The home-market effect, for instance, illustrates 
agglomeration by utilizing relative profits between regions as the driving mechanism that induces firms 
to locate in one region versus another. The cost component in equilibrium profits, (𝜎 − 1)𝛼, contains a 
fixed cost barrier to entry. This expression for regional profits is also useful from a policy-maker's 
standpoint since (𝜎 − 1)𝛼 is potentially a kind of subsidy that could be offered to start-up firms so that 
free entry and exit can be achieved, bolstering the competitive environment of the formal sector. Again, 




  Consider now the wage equation in a multilateral setting. Since the expression for wages 
𝑞𝑟(𝑖)(𝑝𝑟)𝜎 = ∑ [𝑇𝑟𝑠]1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠𝑁𝑠  applies only to a single variety i, one will want to aggregate this 
expression across the total number of varieties for region r to yield an aggregate level of bilateral 
exports from region r to region s. At profit maximizing and market clearing levels, all firms in region r can 
break-even if they produce 𝑞�𝑟 = (𝜎 − 1)𝛼. If one assumes that firms produce the same quantities at 
profit maximizing levels then 𝑞�𝑟 = 𝑞�𝑟(𝑖). In other words, one can assume that all regional varieties are 
produced at the same levels 1
𝑁𝑟
∑ 𝑞𝑟(𝑖)𝑁𝑟𝑖 = 𝑞�𝑟 = 𝑞∗ (Redding, Venables, 2004). Hence, substituting this 
expression into the wage equation 𝑞𝑟(𝑖)(𝑝𝑟)𝜎 = 𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠 and multiplying each side by the 
number of firms in region r 𝑁𝑟 and by (𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎  yields the empirical formulation, albeit non-
operationalized form, of the wage equation. This equation is the gravity equation. 
𝑁𝑟𝑞�𝑟𝑝𝑟 = 𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠1−𝜎𝜇𝑌𝑠  
 
Empirics of Gravity in terms of Market Potential 
 Increasing returns and imperfect competition were presented in the previous section of this 
paper to explain the existence of heterogeneous wages over space. The DSK model determines the 
equilibrium scale of production and markups of price over marginal cost independently of regional 
incomes. As such, wages can be shown to be endogenized in the DSK framework as was presented 
above. Yet, how might we test the theoretical relationship posed between wages, prices, regional 
incomes, and transport costs? One such method has been to identify grouped components of these 
variables through estimations of gravity. 
 The applied empirical component of this paper will estimate the parameters of the gravity 




 firms in region r 𝑁𝑟. �𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠1−𝜎𝜇𝑌𝑠�  on the other hand is composed of three distinct 
elements which will be discussed here. The first of these elements is market potential. 
 One observes that economic activity appears to be greatest where we find the most exchange in 
goods and services. The mere proximity one finds oneself to large centers of exchange incentivizes one's 
participation therein. The scale of economic activity and the existence of space has in fact been 
formalized in the arena of economic geography. We call the measurement that combines these two 
pieces of information "market potential" (Harris, 1954). Motivation for such a measure arises when one 
observes that the potential demand for goods and services produced in any one location depends upon 
the distance-weighted incomes of all locations in a spatial economy. Market potential thus is an abstract 
index of the intensity of possible contact with markets and it can generally be described as a distance 
weighted GDP of neighboring regions in an economy. One such formulation of market potential might 
take the following form: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑟 =  � 𝑌𝑟𝑅
𝑠=1,𝑠≠𝑟 /𝑑𝑟𝑠 
 𝑑𝑟𝑠 denotes distance between centroids of a region. Subscripts r and s denote the spatial 
centroids of a set of markets defined by their geographic extent in terms of Cartesian coordinates. This 
formulation of market potential also has an empirical form: 
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑟 =  � 𝜇𝑌𝑟𝑅
𝑠=1,𝑠≠𝑟 𝑑𝑟𝑠𝛿  
 Here, the parameter 𝛿 is expected to take values greater than 1 after estimation. The empirical 
form of market potential is called nominal because it does not account for c.i.f. prices or regional price 




 subsection above. Real market potential can thus be presented as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑟 =  � 𝜇𝑌𝑟𝑅
𝑠=1,𝑠≠𝑟 𝜙𝑟𝑠𝑃𝑠𝜎−1 
 Where again for the sake of thoroughness 𝜙𝑟𝑠 ≡ 𝑇𝑟𝑠
−(𝜎−1) and 0 < 𝜙𝑟𝑠 < 1 and is symmetric 
across "dyads" (e.g. trade pairs), and where 𝜙𝑟𝑠 = 0 denotes perfectly prohibitive trade. Real market 
potential is in theory a component of the wage equation.  
 
Market Access and Freeness of Trade 
 Recall the multilateral trade flow equation: 
𝑁𝑟𝑞�𝑟𝑝𝑟 = 𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠1−𝜎𝜇𝑌𝑠 
 This equation is derived from the wage equation. Inspecting the multi region case of the wage 
equation, 𝑞𝑟(𝑝𝑟)𝜎 = ∑ [𝑇𝑟𝑠]1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠𝑁𝑠 , one discerns that real market potential is just another name 
for the wage equation. Note also that market potential is a negative linear function of transport costs, a 
positive function of foreign market size, and that market potential is negatively related to prices abroad, 
𝑃𝑠. Venables decomposes the analytic expression here into three components for the purposes of easing 
econometric estimation (Redding, Venables, 2004). The first of these analytic expressions is "market 
access". He decomposes the expressions to illustrate some basic economic intuition. For one, market 
access describes the forward-linkages in an economy - these linkages might be described as the 
geographic or network linkages between a region of producers and every other regional market. In the 
case presented so far, And much like real market potential, market access is weighted by 




 market access (Redding, Venables, 2004). Market access can be further broken down into two basic 
components: "market capacity" and "freeness of trade".  
𝑞𝑟(𝑝𝑟)𝜎 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 𝜙𝑟𝑠(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟) 
 Where 𝜙𝑟𝑠 ≡ 𝑇𝑟𝑠
−(𝜎−1) and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠𝑁𝑠 . Hence, market capacity is the 
price-weighted summation of all the buying-power across other regional markets s facing region r. 
Trade/transport costs are summarized with 𝜙𝑟𝑠, the spatial discount factor. This factor is more widely 
known as the "freeness of trade" parameter 0 < 𝜙𝑟𝑠 < 1, where a value of 0 describes autarkic bilateral 
trade relations. In theory, this parameter typically arises in the theory when we choose not to 
empirically derive an expression for 𝑇𝑟𝑠. 𝑇𝑟𝑠 is arguably difficult to observe since it is a function of 
several geographic, political, and cultural variables. I will return to this point shortly. In short, 𝜙𝑟𝑠  is an 
indirect measure of trade costs whose estimation simply requires data on internal and external trade 
flows (Combes, et. al, 2008). Ideally we use intra and interregional exports to calculate: 
𝜙�𝑟𝑠 = �𝑞𝑠𝑟𝑞𝑟𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑟𝑞𝑠𝑠 
 Where 𝑞𝑠𝑟 + 𝑞𝑟𝑟 = 𝑞𝑟 and 𝑞𝑟𝑠 + 𝑞𝑠𝑠 = 𝑞𝑠 in-line with the export-import subscripting logic.  
 My application deviates from this analytic form since internal trade costs are difficult to observe 
empirically. Many empirical applications of economic geography choose to estimate the internal cost 
component of 𝜙�𝑟𝑠  but only by assuming that internal trade costs are a function of regional land mass 
(Redding, Venables, 2004). I argue that the inclusion of internal trade flows into the data-set leads to a 
parameter estimate for internal trade costs may not align well in my study: all of the ASEAN+3 countries 
in my data-set rely heavily on waterways and oceans for the movement of freight. In short, I assume 




  Hence, my application is in line with much of the applied literature by estimating trade costs 
directly. I continue to use 𝜙𝑟𝑠  to represent trade costs for ease of exposition despite its traditional usage 
in empirical frameworks that attempt to measure internal trade costs.  
 Trade costs are theoretically composed of different underlying costs. These underlying costs are 
always costs faced by one region/country given its geographic or political-economic orientation with 
respect to another region/country. 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇) = 𝐴 + 𝛿 𝑙𝑛(𝑑) +  𝜆𝐾𝑟𝑠 
 Where A is a freight cost "shifter" that may have to be instrumented for and 𝐾𝑟𝑠  is a real valued 
vector of 𝑘  variables, which might include political-economic or linguistic commonalities between r and 
s. Substituting this expression into a gravity models, estimating the parameters on distance and border 
effects, provides the necessary ingredients for solving for 𝜙. The general form of predicted trade costs 
follows thusly: 
𝜙�𝑟𝑠 = 𝑒𝛿� ln(𝑑𝑟𝑠)+∑ 𝜆�𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑠𝐾𝑘  
 𝜙�𝑟𝑠  is therefore a function of natural-logged bilateral Euclidian distances between trade 
partners given by ln (𝑑𝑟𝑠) and a series of dyadic political, geographic, and cultural variables 𝑘𝑟𝑠 ∈  𝐾. 
Note that these dyadic variables are not naturally logged. Estimated directly in my application, 𝜙�𝑟𝑠  can 
be constructed from parameter estimates of these aforementioned variables, which are obtained from 
structural estimation. The concern that most practitioners, including myself, have with this sort of 
approach to approximating trade/transport costs is twofold: (a) the problem of omitted variable bias 
and (b) bias due to excluding "multilateral resistance" indices (i.e. price indices) (Feenstra, 2003). I will 




  International economists typically use cross-panel gravity models at geographies smaller than 
the state level (Anderson, Wincoop, 2004). These data-sets contain intracountry alongside intercountry 
data; for instance, trade flows observed between states and provinces alongside trade flows observed 
between the countries containing those states and provinces. Practitioners have found a statistically 
significant effect on a parameter estimate for a dummy-variable that indicates whether a trade-flow 
corresponds to intercountry trade. Termed "the border effect", trade theory attributes strong border 
effects to the presence of "relative trade barriers" (Anderson, Wincoop, 2004). More explicitly stated, 
border effects are theoretically shown to exhibit upward bias during estimation if multilateral resistance 
is omitted from the operationalized model. This hypothesis has been verified empirically in numerous 
applications (Feenstra, 2003). The origins of this bias stem from the causality issues, or rather 
endogeneity that arises from the partial equilibrium of new trade theory.  Consider the trade flows of 
variety i from r to s given from before: 
𝑋𝑟𝑠 = 𝑇𝑟𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖) = [𝑝𝑟𝑠(𝑖)]−𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠 
 This equation can be solved for 𝑃𝑠, the inward multilateral resistance index, yielding: 
𝑃𝑠 = �𝑋𝑟𝑠[𝑝𝑟𝑠(𝑖)]−𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝜇𝑌𝑠 �1/𝜎−1 
 Hence, if 𝑃𝑠 is considered endogenous, which is in fact the case in a partial equilibrium 
framework, it is clear that 𝑃𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑇𝑟𝑠) where 𝑓(𝑇𝑟𝑠) denotes a transformation. Even so we know that 
𝑃𝑠 = �∫ [𝑇𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑟(𝑖)]−(𝜎−1)𝑑𝑖𝑛0 �−1/(𝜎−1), which implies that inward multilateral resistance, given by 
domestic price indices, is a function of trade/transport costs. A similar exercise can be performed for 
output prices 𝑝𝑟𝑠 for any i, which Van Wincoop designates as an outward multilateral resistance index. 
 Van Wincoop argues that if 𝑇𝑟𝑠 is determined solely with geographic variables such as bilateral 




 omitted effects of 𝑃𝑠 due to its positive correlation with 𝑃𝑠. I argue however that this view can only be 
tested under an all too generalizing empirical framework. Trade economists observe that trade costs do 
not include merely physical logistic expenses but also information, monitoring, and policy costs 
associated with international transactions. Relevant country characteristics such as these are typically 
unobservable but can be captured with fixed-effects econometric methods, which proxy 
𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠 from the expression for region r exports with fixed effect region dummies (Combes, 
et. al, 2008). These fixed-effect approaches to estimating "access" measures capture multilateral 
resistance but at the cost of discarding data on 𝜇𝑌𝑠.  
 Moreover, applications are notorious for using estimated parameters from gravity to construct 
expressions of "access" and "freeness of trade" measures that are empirically correlated to per capita 
income instead of wages. Given the wide availability of wage data at even town-level geographies, this 
estimation strategy appears to be naive. Lastly, these fixed effect methods produce estimates of 
"access" and "freeness of trade" within a spatial panel, rather than a time panel dataset. In essence, this 
means that the estimated parameter effects of the variable components of trade/transport costs given 
by 𝜙�𝑟𝑠 = ∑ 𝑒𝛿� ln(𝑑𝑟𝑠)+∑ 𝜆�𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑠𝐾𝑘𝑁𝑟≠𝑠  are not region-specific. This is troublesome, because some policy 
effects are not generalizable: is diplomatic coercion really generalizable across countries? I will discuss 
these points in the next section. Nevertheless, despite all these contentions, authors contend that the 
exclusion of 𝑃𝑠 gives rise to the “gold medal mistake” that must be avoided in gravity model estimation 
to avoid biased estimates on trade costs (Baldwin, Taglioni, 2007). Is the common practitioner therefore 
a doomed Olympiad?  
 Some notable authors take the approach I offer in this paper, which is quite a motivating factor 
for my applications. Feestra argues that the empirical inclusion of 𝑃𝑠 may not adequately capture other 




 and cultural (Feenstra, 2003). Intriguingly, the theoretical relationship between gravity and 
agglomeration is useful from a political-economic practitioner's standpoint: 𝜙𝑟𝑠  is theoretically 
correlated to a wide-range of variables ranging from the geographic and cultural to the political 
(Feenstra, 2003). The effects of these political-economic variables can be estimated, which is the 
primary exercise carried-out in this paper.  
 Hence, I elect to use political economic controls in the gravity model estimation because they 
resemble a component of trade costs that enter into the estimates for market access. Recall that 
Anderson and Van Wincoop attempt to parameterize trade barrier costs with respect to variables such 
as directly measured trade costs, distance, adjacency, trade-bloc membership, and other typical gravity 
model controls. Their theory that 𝑃�, the “index of multilateral resistance”, is a function of certain trade-
costs such as those captured by distance and border effects, is analogues to the construction of the phi-
ness of trade parameter (Anderson, Wincoop, 2004). NEG literature, like trade literature, emphasizes 
that although aggregate trade cost measurements can be estimated in a variety of ways, the inclusion of 
geographic and political-economic country-level observable characteristics will bias estimates unless a 
multilateral price index can be estimated with industry-level price indices and tariff data. 
 I assume that tariff costs and other trade costs are determined independently within the context 
of the gravity model. Since I do not use tariff data, I presume that tariff effects are captured by the 
absence of FTA or ASEAN and/or WTO membership for a given country. A country-pair that does not for 
example enforce an FTA is assumed to be faced with tariff-borne trade costs. The effects of these trade-
costs can be captured with "inward and outward region-specific dummies" (Anderson, Wincoop, 2004). 
However, the application I propose will be limited to ASEAN, which encompasses the regions of East 
Asia, South East Asia, and Oceania. Hence, one estimation method which is used by Head and Mayer 




 dummies. The estimates on parameters using this method are unbiased (Anderson, Wincoop, 2004). 
This procedure was described in previous sections above (Head, Mayer, 2003).  
 However, this paper will not capture trade-costs with country-specific fixed effects because it is 
interested in capturing geographical and political-economic effects on trade flows. Anderson and Van 
Wincoop note that "[the gravity model] can only measure trade barriers relative to some benchmark" 
(Anderson, Wincoop, 2004). Their primary alternative to capturing multilateral resistance with country-
specific fixed effects is a simple summary measure of trade costs for a particular region j with all of its 
trading partners including itself - where costs are broken down by importing and exporting costs 
(Anderson, Wincoop, 2004). Hence, some measure of internal trade costs is a necessary ingredient. I 
choose not to use their suggested aggregate measures because of aggregation bias that may lead to 
endogeneity with regional-trade bloc indicator dummies. Nevertheless, I do attempt to account for 
internal trade costs by using internal distance measures. The key differentiator in my data-set are 
countries who were in ASEAN versus countries that were not in ASEAN for some particular time period: 
ASEAN+3 status is in effect a control. This formulation makes it possible to identify how trade barriers in 
the absence of ASEAN partnership might affect bilateral trade. 
 Because I opt to shy away from using a country fixed-effects approach without the use of 
aggregate price data, I understand that my parameter estimates may be biased, especially if proxies for 
trade costs such as membership to currency unions and FTAs are endogenous with trade flows. Hence,  
there is a clear trade-off between the two gravity model functional forms presented above. Without 
price index or tariff data, the economist either may opt to capture "multilateral" resistance with country 
fixed-effects - at the cost of being unable to differentiate between different several sources of trade 
friction that may affect prices - or may opt to adopt the form presented above and consequently lose 




 fixed-effects methodology produces theoretically unbiased parameter estimates, it assumes that all 
trade-cost distorting policies can and must be summarized with a country-level fixed effect.   
 
Supply Access   
 Economic geographical theory also concerns itself with the "backward linkages" in an economy. 
These linkages are specifically the physical and business-network connections between an exporting 
regions' firms and their input suppliers. These inputs typically refer to intermediate goods, which are a 
value-added component to final production. They do not refer to labor inputs. The expression for 
backward linkages is embedded in the wage equation. Recall its multilateral form: 
𝑞𝑟(𝑝𝑟)𝜎 = ∑ [𝑇𝑟𝑠]1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠𝑁𝑠 , 
 The backward linkages for region r, the exporting region, are given by region r's "supply access". 
Supply access is not readily expressed in the wage equation. After homogenizing the composite good 
across regions and rearranging terms, recall the trade flows equation for exporter r: 
𝑋𝑟𝑠 = 𝑁𝑟𝑞�𝑟𝑝𝑟 = 𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠1−𝜎𝜇𝑌𝑠 
 The careful reader might observe that market access is contained on the right hand side. More 
relevant however is the presence of supply access which is made up of two components: "freeness of 
trade" and supply capacity.  
𝑁𝑟𝑞�𝑟𝑝𝑟 = (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟)(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟) = (𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟)𝜙𝑟𝑠(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟) 
 Where 𝜙𝑟𝑠 ≡ 𝑇𝑟𝑠
−(𝜎−1) and 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟 =  𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎 . Supply capacity is the product of 




 doubles the value of sales (Redding, Venables, 2004).  Note that market access is a negative function of 
domestic input prices and a positive function of the number of domestic firms.  
  Taken together, market access and supply access theoretically both have a positive effect on 
wages in region r and exports to region s. Moreover, as these access measures increase for region r, one 
would expect long-run agglomeration to occur across such regions. Because of this, one may wish to 
investigate how trade/transport costs affect "access" scores via their opposing effects against "capacity"  
effects. Once it is determined how different political, geographic, economic, and cultural factors weigh-
into the determination of these "access" scores, one will gain an understanding of the driving forces of 
agglomeration. With these general motivations in mind, I will discuss the variables considered in my 
model. Following an overview of the data, I will lay-out the operationalized forms of the empirical model 
components presented above. 
 
Part Three: Empirics  
Variables and Data 
  Practitioners in economic geography are first and foremost concerned with identifying 
geographic, political, economic, and demographic factors that give rise to agglomerative forces. Where 
firms locate and why is perhaps the most important question faced by the private sector on a day-by-
day basis. Policy makers may ask similar questions but may focus on country-level variables that are 
more policy oriented. Where foreign direct investment is targeted and why may just be a policy maker's 
analogue to the question posed by the CEO's of major corporations. The primary policy tool I will focus 




  This tool is often studied in the field of international relations and its effectiveness has only 
received limited study in that body of literature. No comprehensive study has in fact investigated the 
effect of economic trade sanctions on the "target" and "sender" economies of a sanction; both the basic 
theoretical causal mechanisms and empirical results of these studies are often heavily debated and 
dismissed (Kirschner, 2002). I believe that the major issue with these studies often lies with the question 
being asked. Nearly all studies on economic trade sanctions ask "whether sanctions meet their 
objectives" and probe what gives rise to "effective sanctions"; they do not ask how sanctions affect 
regional economies. Dependent variables are often a binary indicator of "success" correlated to 
arbitrary valuations of sanction potency. Estimations are carried out in a regional-panel dataset under a 
logit framework with gravity variables as controls (Hufbauer, et. al, 2009).   
 Moreover, the studies conducted on sanctions implement regressions in a spatial non-time-
series panel setting, just like their new trade theory counterparts, which explains away spatial-variation. 
Hence, their parameter estimates  over-generalize space and cannot be used to inform the foreign 
policy of a country, especially in light of the rich historical, cultural, geographic, social, demographic, 
economic and political dissimilarities that exist across nations.  I will briefly discuss the work that has 
been done on economic trade sanctions before turning to other political-economic variables included in 
my application. 
 
Variables: Sanction Costs, Economic Variables,  and Political Economic Controls 
I. Sanction Costs 
 The use of comprehensive trade sanctions as a tool of coercion has increased dramatically since 




 are more commonly called – are viewed as a critical component of the successful application of power in 
the 21st century and measuring their success in this regard has become the object of much discourse in 
the arena of political-economy and peace studies over this last decade (Drezner, 2011). Much research 
that studies the effect of sanctions considers the measurement of bilateral trade flows as a “concrete 
yardstick” by which the direct impact of comprehensive unilateral sanctions can be analyzed. The 
inclusion of an indicator for trade sanctions in a gravity model is hence arguably important if a strong 
correlation can be established between trade flows and the presence of trade sanctions. 
 Generally, sanctions may be defined as temporary abrogation of normal state-to-state relations 
to pressure target states into changing specified policies or modifying behavior in suggested directions 
(Abunimah, et. al, 2002). The most notable piece in the trade sanctions literature has measured the 
severity of trade sanctions on a sanctioned country’s bilateral trade with Gravity Models of trade 
(Hufbauer, et. al, 2009). These models argue that one of the primary intentions of trade sanctions is to 
isolate a country's economy from the rest of the world. These models utilize the traditional controls in a 
gravity model, but also use several binary indicators that classify the type of trade sanction being 
imposed. Hufbauer, the leading scholar in this body of literature, has found that U.S. voluntary, 
mandatory, and multilateral trade sanctions in particular do not reduce the target country’s trade with 
its other trade partners; rather, trade sanctions of broader scope are correlated with larger predicted 
total trade flows. In estimating gravity parameters, Hufbauer uses logit to investigate factors that are 
correlated to increased sanction success (Hufbauer, et. al, 2009). He finds that the likelihood of sanction 
"success" is often tied to the "cost" of a sanction. To summarize, his study finds that sanctions only seem 
to affect bilateral trade flows and may only have multilateral implications if they are backed by real costs 




  Prevailing literature on the effectiveness of past trade sanctions has studied regional food prices 
during the 90s in Iraq (Abunimah, et. al, 2002). These studies analyzed correlations between Iraqi 
domestic policy, food markets, and "sanction costs". Food markets were measured with CPI's for the 
Iraqi food industry and policy measured with Polity index scores. These studies presented inconclusive 
evidence but made important strides in terms of initiating data-collection. The Polity Index for example 
has undergone four revisions since its inception (Marshall, 2014). Sanction costs have similarly 
undergone similar scrutiny: Morgan's fourth version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 
(TIES) database exists alongside the Hufbauer-Schott-Elliott (HSE) sanctions database for measuring 
sanction costs (Morgan, et. al, 2013). The TIES database in particular sets-out to measure various 
aspects of sanction costs such as the credible threat, the anticipated cost to sender, anticipated cost to 
target, and associate nominal and "final" costs. "Costs" are arguably arbitrarily construed in that they 
are primarily based on qualitative political-economic factors and not merely economic characteristics. 
Consequently, costs are given with an ordinal ranking often ranging from 0 to 3. I therefore assign 
sanction costs from the perspective of the senders of sanctions. Despite these short-comings, the 
strength in the TIES database really lies in its classification of sanction types, which are broken down into 
economic embargos, export restrictions, and import restrictions.  
 More recently, literature on comprehensive sanctions have investigated the affect of trade 
sanctions on regime change and the types of political issues that economic sanctions are most effective 
in addressing. Bepat and Morgan find for example in using OLS that multilateral sanctions are indeed 
correlated with statistically significant rates of regime change if one controls for the kind of multilateral 
and institutional backing behind the sanction (Bepat and Morgan, 2009). Letskian and Souva attempt to 
answer whether the choice of sanction targets is consistent with the theory of democratic peace. Using 
a simple logit framework, they find that democracies are significant less likely to use comprehensive 




 coercion through sanctions is less likely to occur. These authors also ask whether the "saliency" of an 
issue (i.e. the severity of demands imposed by the sender) are correlated at all to successful sanctions. 
They find that costly sanctions should be less likely to succeed against nondemocratic targets, and that 
the greater the salience of the demands by the sender, the lesser the likelihood of sanction success 
(Lektzian, Souva, 2007). 
 In short, sanctions research focuses on measuring the factors that affect the "likelihood of 
sanction success" and the types of trade sanctions that actually have their intended effect on 
multilateral trade. The studies outlined above primarily investigate the appropriate "controls" that 
should be included in causal regression frameworks. The leading authors find that institutional backing, 
multilateral settings, issue saliency (e.g. costs), and political regime type are correlated to sanction 
success in both positive and negative ways. Nearly all studies find that regime type (i.e. polity) is 
correlated to sanction occurrence: more than 78% of sanctions in the past three decades were imposed 
on nondemocratic target states (Allen, 2008). Lastly, sanctions seem to affect bilateral trade and appear 
to meet their policy objectives when the costs to the target are high.  
 The primary take-aways from this literature are utilized in my study. I focus on bilateral trade 
between dyads and investigate a causal relationship between sanction costs and bilateral trade. I 
specifically focus on the nominal sanction costs to the target of a sanction. I however do not wish to 
merely study the effect of sanction costs on bilateral trade. Instead, I mean to investigate the 
transmitted effect of trade sanctions on exporter wage levels. However, in order to more neatly 
accomplish this, I utilize the controls that have been found to be statistically significant in the sanctions 
literature. These controls include polity and membership to multilateral institutions such as the WTO 
and ASEAN+3. Data structure is also of utmost importance: to more accurately capture the effects of 




 to use time-series panel data for one specific country and its dyads instead of using a dataset containing 
all possible dyads combinations. Bilateral trade data and economic data can be easily obtained for a 
time-panel, which I will now briefly discuss. 
 
II. Economic and Geographic Variables 
 Time-series trade-flow data, GDP data, and wage data are the three key observations employed 
in the empirical application of this paper. Trade-flow data are collected from the International Monetary 
Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics database using quarterly time series from 1988-2013 for the 
following countries: Australia, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan and Vietnam. Taiwanese trade data are not present in the IMF 
data-set because of international agreements with the People's Republic of China (PRC) which forbid the 
recognition of Taiwan as a country.  Hence, Taiwanese bilateral trade data are collected from the 
Taiwanese National Statistics website - the DGBAS. I choose the time-span of 1988-2013 for mostly 
practical reasons: bilateral trade-data are not reliable for many countries in my data-set prior to 1988. 
Even so, some bilateral pairs' trade flow data had to be backward and forward predicted by regressing 
flows on GDP. Moreover, the chosen time-span aligns well with the political-economic data employed in 
this study: the TIES, Polity IV, and Correlates of War databases contain data for the time period 1988-
2013. Since the time-series data may be serially correlated, the data are corrected for seasonal trends 
around the means.  
 The time-series data here are joined to incomes data - more specifically, annual average real 
wage index data (2005=100) acquired from the Economist Intelligence Unit. These data are collected 
annually but are transformed via interpolation to exhibit quarterly seasonal trends.  Geographic data are 




  After joining all of these data, each country-pair contains 99 time-series observations. The 
combined data-set of all country-pair observations contains 99 times 12 times 13 entries. I will now 
quickly discuss the political-economic controls used in this study. 
 
III. Political Economic Controls 
 I hypothesize that a myriad of political economic controls may have a statistically significant 
relationship with trade flows in gravity. The multilateral indicator controls will consist first of a set of 
dummy variables for membership to ASEAN, the GATT/WTO, and dyadic FTA policies. If a country in the 
dataset belongs to ASEAN or the GATT/WTO, their corresponding ASEAN and/or GATT/WTO cell is coded 
with a corresponding 1 respectively. The data for these indicators are drawn from the ARIC database, 
the WTO website, and the Asian World Bank website.  
 The second set of controls includes discrete rank-ordinal variables, which are Polity, Dyad 
Hostility, and Social Unrest.  Polity scores are taken from the Polity IV database. Dyad hostility and social 
unrest are taken from the Correlates of War database. Polity scores range from -10 to +10, with -10 
indicating nearly a completely totalitarian state and +10 indicating nearly a completely democratic state. 
Dyad Hostility ranges from 0 to 4: higher scores indicating greater hostility between a dyad. Sanction 
costs borne to the exporting country of a dyad are drawn from the TIES database. Values range from 1 
to 3 - the higher number denoting more severe costs to the sender. Lastly, Social Unrest also spans 0 to 
4: higher scores indicating higher social unrest in the exporting country. 
  The inclusion of political-economic controls such as these presented here is important from a 
causal perspective because we are fairly certain from empirical evidence that sanction effectiveness is 
correlated to our controls - independent of disturbances. Sanction effectiveness is of course absent from 




 the likelihood of sanction success conditional on covariates.  If political-economic controls Βrm and Εs
q 
are indeed conditionally independent from the unobservables in the logit model, then in theory we 
should use them as controls alongside sanction-costs within the gravity model. Formally, we know that: 








+ 𝜀𝑟𝑠  
𝐸�Βrm ,Εsq�𝜀𝑟𝑠� = 0 
 Hence, we assume no endogeneity and assume spherical error terms. Here r and s are regions in 
a given dyad rs and m and q are conditionally independent regressors generated i.i.d. Hence, if 
𝑓(𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑠) denotes a transformation of sanction-related political-economic data 
into some kind of sanction-cost indicator, and  𝐶𝑜𝑣�𝑔(Βrm,Εsq)�𝑓(𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑠)� ≠ 0, 
then the exclusion of 𝑔(Βrm ,Εsq) from the gravity model may bias the parameter estimate on 
𝑓(𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑠) in part due to omitted variable bias. To formalize this notion, I now 
introduce the operationalized form of the gravity model of trade. 
 
Gravity Operationalization 
 Recall the theoretical gravity model: 
𝑋𝑟𝑠 = 𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠1−𝜎𝜇𝑌𝑠 
 Venables uses this model to account for relative regional GDPs and gravity-controls so that we 
can identify explanatory economic and geographic variables that affect wages (Redding, Venables, 
2004). The inclusion of additional political-economic policy variables such as membership to a regional 




 from political-economic effects. After taking natural logs on GDP and bilateral distance, the more 
generalized version of the gravity equation is thus: 




 + 𝜀𝑟𝑠 
 This model is the generalized empirical gravity model employed in my study. It is general 
because its specification is flexible across different country pairs: political-economic variables may be 
completely irrelevant in some dyad specifications. This flexibility is accommodated by the FIML 
estimation procedure (Wymer, 2006). Here 𝑙𝑟 corresponds to the set of gravity control variables specific 
to the exporting country only (i.e. unilateral variables), which includes WTO membership, ASEAN 
membership, degree of social unrest, and polity. 𝑘𝑟𝑠  corresponds to a set of bilateral gravity control 
variables which include common language, signed free trade agreement, sanction costs to the sender, 
and dyad hostility. Redding and Venables employ international political-economic openness measures 
for the exporter and importer in a given dyad, which they consider to be an effective approach at 
quantifying components of country specific characteristic effects; these measures are essentially 
composite indices of tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers, black market exchange premiums, state 
monopoly presence on exports, and the existence of a socialist economic system (Redding, Venables, 
2004). I will not myself utilize an international openness measure - and indeed many different indices 
such as the human freedom or index of economic freedom do exist for this purpose. Rather, I will 
attempt to utilize membership to regional trade agreements among other more specific political-
economic robustness controls for openness.  
 The estimation strategy for the system above is conducted across s pairs 𝑠 ≠ 𝑟. Hence, upon the 
completion of estimation there will be for region r a vector of rank s predictions of 𝑋�𝑟𝑠. Each gravity 




 estimations of the gravity model in the NEG setting, which attempt to estimate model parameters in a 
linear fixed-effects framework (Combes, et. al, 2008). In other words, my estimation requires that 
different region-pairings are not bundled together into the same data-set for estimation. Authors have 
typically approached estimation with fixed-effect panel methods for a variety of reasons: this strategy 
permits the economist to present effects in a more generalized way and it is less cumbersome from a 
data-collection standpoint. Nevertheless, there are inherent weaknesses to this approach: one assumes 
that unobserved regional characteristics are the same across all region-pairs and that economic policies 
have a general effect on all countries. I deviate from this framework by assuming that the characteristics 
of region-pairs and the effects of economic policies have been constant over time for specific pairings. I 
perform a non-linear structural estimation that controls for time variations prior to estimation. This 
structural estimation minimizes the negative of the log of the determinant of the residual variance-
covariance matrix. Hence, I estimate the gravity model above 12 times for any 1 country in my data-set 
of 13 countries. Parameter estimates from each gravity model are collected to eventually construct a 
single market access and supply access score for the given country. I employ a full-information 
maximum likelihood estimation algorithm for identifying each set of gravity model parameters (Wymer, 
2006). This algorithm permits the practitioner of the NEG to identify the wage equation parameters in a 
structural setting - in my application, I utilize the reduced structural form proposed by Venables 
(Redding, Venables, 2004). The algorithm allows one to place constraints on parameter bounds while 








 Wage Equation Operationalization 
 I utilize Venables' method of parameterizing the reduced-form wage equation. Recall the 
structural form of the wage equation for a region-pair: 
𝑞𝑟(𝑖)(𝑝𝑟)𝜎 = 𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠 
 The gravity model makes it possible to test the wage equation by correlating wages to reduced-
form expressions of the RHS, also known as market access and supply access: 
𝑋𝑟𝑠 = 𝑁𝑟𝑞�𝑟𝑝𝑟 = [𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎]𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎[𝑃𝑠1−𝜎𝜇𝑌𝑠] 
 Notice again that 𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎 = 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟, that 𝑃𝑠1−𝜎𝜇𝑌𝑠 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟, and 
that 𝑇𝑟𝑠
1−𝜎 = 𝜙𝑟𝑠.  
 Parameter estimates obtained from the gravity model are used to construct supply access and 
market access:  
 [𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎]𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎 = 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟  and 𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎[𝑃𝑠1−𝜎𝜇𝑌𝑠] = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 . Since the 
gravity model is estimated by first taking the natural logs of 𝑌𝑠, 𝑌𝑟  and 𝑑𝑟𝑠, the construction of market 
and supply access scores must first rescale 𝑌𝑠, 𝑌𝑟  and 𝑑𝑟𝑠 by taking their exponents. Market access for 
region r is thus constructed using the parameter estimates from 12 gravity models in the following 
manner: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟 = 𝑒𝑙𝑛 (𝑌𝑟)𝜏𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑟𝑟)1−𝜎 + �𝑒𝜉𝑟𝑠𝐿𝑛(𝑌𝑠) + 𝛿𝑟𝑠,2𝐿𝑛(𝑑𝑟𝑠) +  𝛿𝑟𝑠,1(𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠) + ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑟𝑠𝐾𝑘 +∑ 𝜄𝑟𝑠𝑙𝑟𝐿𝑙  𝑅
𝑟≠𝑠
 
 Where 𝑡𝑟𝑟1−𝜎 = 1 by assumption of cross-regional homogenous internal transport distances, 
which is a typical assumption in the literature (Anderson, Wincoop, 2004). The first collection of terms in 




 collection of terms is an enhanced form of Venables' "foreign market access" measure. Notice also that 
foreign price indices 𝑃𝑠 are absent from the RHS of this formulation, which in essence summarizes the 
forward-linkages in a regional economic system. Notable authors in Economic Geography have 
traditionally circumvented this problem by employing a fixed-effects panel estimation strategy (Combes, 
et. al, 2008). A less indirect approach to obtaining the inclusivity of prices in this particular structural 
framework might utilize industry-aggregate CPI measures. The absence of domestic price indices leads 
to the problem of multilateral resistance bias as outlined by Anderson and Vin Wincoop, and proceeding 
thusly essentially yields a measurement of "nominal" market potential.    
 If one accepts nominal market potential as a suitable correlative to regional aggregate wages, 
then nominal supply potential is calculated in a similar fashion.  
 Similar to the market access measure (e.g. identified as nominal market potential), supply access 
here is missing the theoretically important component of domestic intermediate industry-aggregate 
input prices. A logical proxy for intermediate industry-aggregate input prices might be an aggregate 
producer price index. This component essentially summarizes the backward-linkages in a regional 
economic system. Recall the importance that this variable plays  in determining the degree to which 
firms are competing with one another in a given region. Notice also the absence of a variable that 
summarizes the number of firms operating in region r. The absence of these two crucial variables 
essentially yields a halfway-house expression for supply access. Its usage in the structural estimation 
presented here is hence simply relegated to that of a theoretical place-holder.  
 Lastly, it is useful although not necessary to quickly examine the analytic expression for 
trade/transport costs, 𝜙𝑟𝑠 . The literature of regional science offers a handful of different ways for 
calculating this expression (Bosker, Garretsen, 2007). Theoretically, Samuelsonian iceberg transportation 




 on cost, insurance, and freight prices alongside free-on-board prices for various commodity baskets. Of 
course, it is often inappropriate to use such a measure since transport costs in terms of purely freight 
rates because these rates may be interregionally homogenous for some industries. In other words, one 
needs to be mindful of industry-specific costs to transport. Moreover, in some countries, transport bears 
a very small proportion of total GDP. Hence, in many country-specific settings, the economist should 
carefully examine how non-labor inputs to production are moved in order to quantify this important 
parameter. One can also take a very general approach to modeling transport/trade costs by simply 
interacting exponential distance-decay with meta-data on aggregate iceberg transport costs.  
 The approach I take for quantifying transport costs in my application is very nominal since the 
econometric estimate of the parameter 𝛿𝑟𝑠,2 (see below) is absent in the model specification used in 
estimation. Analytic transport costs are formulated with: 
𝜙𝑟𝑠 = 𝑒𝛿𝑟𝑠,2𝐿𝑛(𝑑𝑟𝑠) +  𝛿𝑟𝑠,1(𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠) + ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑟𝑠𝐾𝑘   
 Notice that this expression is already found in the analytic formulation of market and supply 
access for a given trade-pair. In practice, the calculation of predicted trade/transport costs is conducted 
within the context of the gravity model, as noted in previous sections of this paper. Practitioners have 
estimated trade/transport costs in a variety of gravity model types, some of which utilize information on 
commute patterns or even migration patterns in-place of the bilateral trade flows that we typically 
associate as the model dependent variable (Wang, 2011).  
 Once market access and supply access terms are computed using the analytic expressions 
above, their predicted analytic expressions are imputed into a second-stage regression within the FIML 
framework. This second stage regression utilizes a reduced-form expression of Venables' wage equation 





 𝑞𝑟𝑠(𝑖) �𝛽 � 𝜎(𝜎 − 1)�𝐺𝑟Φ𝑤𝑟Ψ𝑣𝑟Θ�𝜎 = 𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠𝜎−1𝜇𝑌𝑠  




proxies this value with per capita GDP. His reduced-form expression is thus: 
�𝐺𝑟
Φ𝑤𝑟Ψ𝑣𝑟Θ�








 Where 𝐴 contains the remaining structural variables and parameters left-out of the expressions 
for supply and market access.  
My application does not break-down factors costs into smaller components; rather, I assume 
only one factor of production, labor, and estimate its cost share to sit somewhere around 0.9. This more 
simplified view is also adopted by Knapp to some extent. Head and Mayer also rearrange the terms in 
the wage equation expression to yield a more simplified estimable form (Head, Mayer, 2003). 
 Taking natural logs on both sides of the structural wage equation and denoting Venables' 
𝐴 = 𝜁𝑟𝑠  yields the following structural wage equation:  
𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑟) = 𝜁𝑟𝑠Ψ𝜎 + 1 −ΨΨ− 𝛼𝜎 𝑙𝑛 �� 𝑁𝑟(𝑝𝑟)1−𝜎𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑅
𝑟,𝑟≠𝑠 � + 1Ψ𝜎 𝑙𝑛 � � 𝑇𝑟𝑠1−𝜎𝑃𝑠1−𝜎𝜇𝑌𝑠𝑅𝑟,𝑟≠𝑠 � 
 In reduced operationalized form, the structural wage equation is expressed as: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑟) = 𝜁𝑟𝑠Ψ𝜎 + 1 − ΨΨ−Ψ𝜎 𝑙𝑛�𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟� � + 1Ψ𝜎 𝑙𝑛�𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑟� � 
 Note that each collection of 12 gravity equation for region r is estimated alongside 1 wage 
equation. The empirical wage equation faces three important theoretical constraints. These parametric 




 be nearly 1. In other words, I impose a requirement that a regional economy's goods be perfect 
substitutes for one another. Most authors recognize that the elasticity of substitution takes on values 
between 5 and 8 (Combes, et. al, 2008). I deviate however from these meta-values since  𝜎 near 1 yields 
model convergence in many of the 13 models implemented in this application. 
 The second theoretical constraint requires that the input share on labor Ψ is less than 1. Ψ < 1. 
This requirement is necessary since it is assumed that input-costs enter a production function in a 
linearly homogenous and symmetric fashion such that they add up collectively to 1.  
 Thirdly, I constrain distance parameters to initially negative values such that distance has an 
overall negative effect on bilateral trade.  
 Using these requirements and setting other parameters to feasible initial values, I implement 
Wymer's (2006) procedure for Gaussian FIML estimation of a non-linear continuous-time model. 
Wymer’s procedure essentially uses a nonlinear maximum likelihood algorithm to estimate a nonlinear 
continuous time model with stocks and flows. This procedure utilizes a 1st-order exponential log 
functional form of both dyadic trade flows and wages given by a set of differential equations: 
𝑙 𝑛�∆𝑋𝑟𝑠(𝑡)� = 𝛾𝑟𝑠 �ln �𝑋�𝑟𝑠𝑋𝑟𝑠��𝑑𝑡 + 𝜁𝑟𝑠(𝑑𝑡) 
𝑙 𝑛�∆𝑤𝑟(𝑡)� = 𝜂𝑟 �ln �𝑤�𝑟𝑤𝑟�� 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜁𝑟(𝑑𝑡) 
 The Wymer algorithm minimizes the log of the determinant of the residual matrix 𝜁𝑟(𝑑𝑡), which 
is the same as maximizing the likelihood function. The estimated endogenous variables here are known 
as the partial equilibrium variables. The parameters 𝜂𝑟  and 𝛾𝑟𝑠 are estimated alongside other key 
structural parameters in this procedure. These parameters are also known as the partial equilibrium 




 parameters as an indicator of how long it takes (typically in financial quarters) for a system to adjust to 
partial equilibrium levels. Literature often identifies this convergence time to be 5.85 quarters. The FIML 
algorithm terminates when the norm of the gradient reaches approximately 0.001 the parameter 
estimates are changing across iterations by no more than 0.001. 
 
Part Four: Results and Conclusion 
Results 
 This study investigates the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Wages are positively correlated with market access. 
Hypothesis 2: Political economic variables, in particular trade sanction costs and dyadic hostilities, have a 
statistically significant effect on trade levels. Trade sanction costs and dyadic hostilities should have a 
negative effect on trade levels. 
 Nominal market access is found to be positively correlated with wages across all countries in the 
ASEAN+3 region. With the exception of Vietnam, whose log-likelihood is low for the model-fit, Australia, 
Taiwan and Thailand exhibit the highest market access effects of all countries in this study - 1.6, 1.1 and 
1.9 respectively. Any rise in market access for these countries leads to larger increases in wages relative 
to other countries in the ASEAN+3 region. Contrastingly, with the exception of New Zealand, whose 
distance from the geometric center of the ASEAN+3 region is farthest, the Philippines, Indonesia, and 




  A major component of empirical market access is freeness of trade. When interacted alongside 
with Venables' market capacity expression, one yields predicted market access. Recall the form of 
freeness of trade: 
𝜙𝑟𝑠 = 𝑒𝛿𝑟𝑠,2𝐿𝑛(𝑑𝑟𝑠) +  𝛿𝑟𝑠,1(𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑠) + ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑟𝑠𝐾𝑘   
 Note that the parameter estimates 𝜆𝑘and especially 𝛿𝑟𝑠,1 have been found to be biased if the 
gravity model is estimated in the absence of data on multilateral resistance (Anderson, Wincoop, 2004). 
Theory and empirics have both shown that the border effect will be biased upwards due to the absence 
of multilateral resistance indices in the empirical specification of the gravity model above. Border effects 
are found to be highly correlated with unobservable trade barriers. The reduced form exporter/importer 
fixed effects gravity model specification is Venables' work-around for this kind of bias.   
 The estimated form of trade/transport costs follows the formula below (Head, Mayer, 2003). 
Note that the second collection of expandable terms in the exponential are political-economic bilateral 
effects. 
𝜙�𝑟𝑠 = 𝑑𝑟𝑠𝛿�𝑟𝑠,2 �𝑒  𝛿�𝑟𝑠,1 + ∑ 𝜆�𝑘𝑟𝑠𝐾𝑘  � 
?̂?𝑘𝑟𝑠: 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐹𝑇𝐴 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡,𝑑𝑦𝑎𝑑 ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 
 I calculate predicted transport costs for each bilateral trade relationship in the data-set. I adjust 
the scores by transforming them into the form 𝜙𝑟𝑠
1−𝜎 ≅ 𝑇𝑟𝑠
1−𝜎. This form assumes that phi is a proxy 
for T is necessary if results were to be imputed into an NEG model. In the case where 𝜙�𝑟𝑠  is found to be 
near 1, this model predicts that bilateral trade faces nearly no barriers to trade; values near 0 are 
however indicative of autarkic trade relations. Indeed, the model presented here reports both extremes 




 coefficients on distance are found to be near zero or even slightly positive, freeness of trade will take on 
a value very close to one. Trade cost estimates should be carefully interpreted for these reasons.  
 As a consequence of the above, predicted bilateral trade/transport costs that take on fairly 
intermediate values between 0 and 1 are of primary interest in this study. Many of the flows can be 
confirmed by anecdotal knowledge. Australia for instance instigates relatively freer trade with Korea, 
New Zealand, and Taiwan compared with its other trading partners in the ASEAN+3 area.  China ensures 
freer trade with Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand in comparison to its other trade relationships. Indonesia 
is found to be relatively autarkic in many of its trade relations; India relatively free. Japan's enacts few 
barriers to trade with Korea and New Zealand; Korea aggressively reduces frictions with the Philippines, 
Australia, and Taiwan. Malaysia is found to have significantly freer trade relations with Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia relative to its other relations; likewise, New Zealand has freer trade with 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan relative to other ASEAN+3 nations. The Philippines appear to have 
friendlier trade relations with Singapore relative to others; however, parameter estimates on distance 
call other inferences into some doubt. Singapore's estimates however are consistent across the board 
and indicate very close trade relations with Taiwan, Thailand, and Malaysia. Thailand's trade is most free 
with Vietnam, the Philippines, and China; Taiwan exhibits strong ties with Indonesia. Last but not least, 
Vietnam exhibits strong ties with Singapore. 
 What I have not listed qualitatively above are the trade relationships that are found to be nearly 
totally unimpeded. Again however, parameter estimates on distance make inference utilizing trade cost 
estimates difficult given their near positive magnitudes.    
 The tabulated trade/transport costs in the appendix illustrate how returns to labor (e.g. wages) 
may be affected by political-economic and geographic variables. Taken in aggregate, trade/transport 




 have penalized their returns to labor relative to other countries given their political-economy. Indeed, 
after controlling for distance, political system, and language, political-economic variables might possibly 
do much to dampen market potential effects in these countries relative to others. Contrastingly, 
Australia, Taiwan and Thailand have done the opposite by pursuing international relations in a more 
accommodating fashion with respect to their labor economy. An examination of these political-
economic effects is given in the appendix. I will investigate (a) polity effects, (b) dyad hostility effects, (c) 
sanction cost effects, and (d) free-trade agreement effects for all countries in the ASEAN+3 region, 
including New Zealand and Australia but excluding Vietnam.  
 
 Australia's polity is among the highest ranked in the Polity IV database - standing at +10 (e.g. 
highly democratic). This polity score is found to be positively correlated with Australian trade flows. 
Nevertheless, this observation does not hold generally across all countries' polity scores: a separate 
cross-country regression would have to be performed to obtain a pooled-dyad effect of polity on trade 
flows.  
 Contrary to what one might expect, the coefficient on Australia's dyad hostility effects does not 
bear a negative sign. Estimated coefficients are significant and positive for relations with Indonesia and 
Japan, but not for China. Hostilities with Indonesia occurred for 1 quarter in 1999 and were initiated by 
Australia with regards to Timor; this dispute is however found to have negligible consequences on the 
Australian exports to Indonesia, possibly due to the de-escalation of the dispute on the part of 
Indonesia. Disputes with Japan also occurred only for 1 quarter in 1998 but hostilities were reciprocated 
by the Japanese. This dispute had its roots in the violation of bluefish tuna sanctuaries in the Southern 




 2001 over air-space above the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea seems to have had a negligible 
effect on relations. 
 Moreover, coefficients on Australia's sanction costs are found to bear positive signs as well. 
Indonesia's 1997 import restriction on Australian exports appears to exhibit some positive correlation 
between the cost borne to Indonesia for sending the sanction and Australian exports to Indonesia. One 
could judge from empirical evidence then that the conflict in East Timor had a limited impact on Austral-
Indonesian trade relations. Similarly, a multilateral export restriction imposed on India in 1998, in which 
Australia was a plaintiff, is found to have had the reverse intended effect: a positive one.  
 Australian FTAs with Singapore and Thailand are found to have positively enhanced trade. The 
FTA with Singapore covers goods and services has been in effect since 2003; the FTA with Thailand also 
covers goods and services and has been in effect since 2005. Australia's FTA with Malaysia covers goods 
and services and has been in effect since 2013. The estimated coefficient on the FTA is found to be 
negative; although, given that the FTA has not been in effect for more than a year since the inception of 
this study, this effect should be interpreted with caution. 
 China's polity of -7 (e.g. highly authoritarian) is found to have complemented its export base, 
which is unsurprising if we consider its fixed exchange rate regime. Significant Chinese dyad hostility 
effects vary in direction however. Sino-Japanese trade relations are found to be positively correlated 
with dispute-onsets. Between 1995 and 1999, 3 disputes broke out between these two countries, all of 
which were initiated by China. Nevertheless, evidence suggests a limited effect of these disputes on 
Chinese exports to Japan. The same dynamic can be found between Korean-Chinese trade relations: a 
dispute in 1994 between China and Korea over fishing rights in the South China Sea is found to be 
positively correlated with Chinese exports to Korea. Lastly, two Chinese-Vietnamese disputes occurring 




 the South China Sea, have had no effect on Chinese exports to Vietnam. These three cases may all 
demonstrate the reluctance of China's South and East Asian neighbors to limit the import of Chinese 
goods into their respective countries. 
 Dyad hostility effects begin to bear their expected negative signs in the cases of Chinese-
Philippine and PRC-ROC relations. The former is a string of complicated affairs, with hostilities being 
initiated by both parties across different years in the 1990s. These disputes occurred at Mischief Reef, 
Ayungin - the former resulting in an illegal forced Chinese occupation and the latter involving a 
premeditated breach of sovereignty. To date, Chinese-Philippine relations are heavily strained by 
disputes over the Spratlys, and the effects can be seen in the trade data: Chinese exports to the 
Philippines have suffered as a consequence. Lastly, PRC-ROC relations - that is relations between the 
People's Republic of China and Taiwan (the Republic of China) - have also suffered due to repeated 
military escalations. Taiwan, is an unofficially recognized country by the United States and has since the 
mid 20th century lost its standing as a UN member. Its disputes with the PRC resonate back to the 
Chinese Civil War that raged between 1946 to 1950. Although data from this period are not considered 
in this study, data covering the period between 1993-2001 are. The most violent of these occurring in 
1995-1996 during the 3rd Taiwan Strait Crisis, in which the PRC violated Taiwanese airspace with cruise-
missile tests. The affair instigated the largest U.S. naval incursion against the PRC since the Vietnam 
War.  Since the mid-90s, disputes between these two countries have centered around territorial sea 
claims in the South China Sea. Taken in aggregate, these hostilities have had a negative impact on 
Chinese exports to Taiwan. 
 Sanction costs to China are found to have a statistically significant negative effect on Chinese 
exports to Korea and Vietnam, but a statistically significant positive effect on exports to Japan. The cost 




 Japanese import restrictions on Chinese exports in 1992 are taken in aggregate to have no negative 
effects on bilateral trade flows. Contrastingly, Chinese import restrictions on Korean goods have been 
outstanding since 1997 and are owed to import substitution policies across the two countries. These 
policies have damaged Sino-Korean trade flows. Lastly, China's sanctions on Vietnam in 1992 are also 
found to have had a negative impact on Chinese exports to Vietnam.  
 Chinese FTAs also tell a mixed story. And FTA with New Zealand which has been in force since 
2008 has been found to enhance Chinese exports. Nevertheless, an FTA of similar scope with Singapore 
that has been in force since 2009 is associated with negative effects to Chinese exports.  
 Taken together, these political-economic effects have not negatively affected China's market 
access in the ASEAN+3 region relative to other countries.  
 Political-economic effects across all Indonesian bilateral relations are found to be significant 
with positive effects on exports. Indonesian polity is quite dynamic however, which makes it unclear as 
to whether certain regimes have been more effectual in promoting trade or not. 
 The effects of Indonesia's hostilities with Australia, China, and New Zealand have all had 
statistically significant negative effects on Indonesian exports to these countries. In the case of Australia 
and New Zealand, this effect may be due to the enactment of barriers to trade by the Australians and 
New Zealanders just short of economic sanctions. Indonesian exports to these countries are also found 
to have been negatively affected by hostilities with China over islands in the South China Sea.  
 As is the case with Australia and China, Indonesian sanction costs have had mixed effects on its 
bilateral relations. An import restriction imposed on Australia in 1997 is found to be positively correlated 
with Indonesian exports to Australia; anti-dumping related import restrictions imposed on China, 




 however in scope to industries like steel, and have evidently been shown to have net negative aggregate 
effect on exports to these countries. On the contrary, import restrictions on Japanese exports in a 
similar trade dispute in 2000 are found to have had a net negative effect on Indonesian exports to 
Japan. To what extent this effect may be based on reciprocal action on the part of the Japanese requires 
additional investigation. 
 Lastly, an Indonesian FTA with Japan which has been in force since 2008 is found to be positively 
correlated to Indonesian exports to Japan. Looking at these effects in aggregate, one might conclude 
that Indonesia's relatively poor market access in the ASEAN+3 region may be due to its hostilities with 
its neighbors, especially China.  
 India is one of two models in this paper whose polity is actually negatively correlated with 
aggregate exports. India's polity has hovered somewhere between +8 and +9 since the latter half of the 
20th century. India has not engaged in any outright hostilities with its neighbors within the scope of the 
data used in this study; however, it has experienced sanction costs. An import restriction imposed on 
China in 1998 is positively correlated with exports to China, which suggests a case of no reciprocation by 
China. An export restriction imposed on India by Australia between 1998-2001 is also found to have had 
a net positive effect on Indian exports to Australia; that is to say that the costs of sending a sanction 
against India on Australia's part is correlated to greater exports flowing to Australia and originating from 
India. These sanctions were imposed in reaction to India's testing of nuclear weapons in 1998. 
 Nevertheless, sanction costs bear their expected negative sign when considering 1993 Indian 
import restrictions on South Korean exports. These restrictions were met by similar South Korean 
restrictions, which have indeed negatively affected Indian exports to South Korea. Japan's export 




 some retaliation on the Indian side. The net effect of these sanctions are negative for India's exports to 
Japan.  
 Taken in aggregate, India's political-economy has kept India export economy competitive in the 
ASEAN+3 region. Despite being geographically located in the peripheries of the ASEAN+3 region, its 
market access to this region exceeds that of Japan, China, and Korea.   
 The Japanese gravity formulation is the most non-linear model in this paper. Nevertheless, FIML 
estimation finds all political-economic variables to be statistically significant. Moreover, nearly all dyad 
hostility and sanction cost coefficients bear the expected negative signs.  
 Japanese polity is found to be positively correlated with export flows. Its hostilities with 
Australia, Korea, and Taiwan are all found to have had historically negative effects on Japanese exports 
to those countries. Australian hostilities with Japan over the bluefish tuna sanctuaries violation resulted 
in a lessening to Japanese exports to Australia. Japan also initiated a dispute with South Korea in 1999 
with regards to a territorial conflict over the Takeshima islands, which is found to have had a negative 
effect on Japanese exports to South Korea. Moreover, Japanese exports to Taiwan were temporarily 
stifled due to Taiwan's handling of dispute over the Senkaku islands following its provocation of the PRC 
with regards to its independence status. Hostilities with China throughout the 90s however are still 
found to have no negative effects on Japanese exports to China or vise versa as presented earlier. 
Clearly, Sino-Japanese trade relations are seen as particularly important by both countries despite their 
disgruntled historical relations. 
 The same pattern regarding Japanese trade relations with China can be observed with respect to 
sanction costs to Japan. Japanese sanctions on China in 1987 taken in aggregate with Chinese import 
restrictions on Japanese exports in 1992 and 2001 are actually positively correlated with Japanese 




 Chinese market. Sanction costs borne to the sender of sanctions have a much different effect on Japan 
with regards to its trade relations with Indonesia, India, Korea, and Taiwan. Indonesian import 
restrictions on Japanese goods in 2000 are found to have a stifling effect on Japanese exports to 
Indonesia as intended; Korean import restrictions in 2001 are found to have a similar effect. Moreover, 
Indian import restrictions in 1998 and Taiwanese import restrictions in 1994 are also found to have 
negatively affected Japanese exports to each of these respective countries. Note that these latter 
inferences are essentially correlating the pain of imposing a sanction by its sender to variation of exports 
flowing to the sender from the target. Taken together, it appears that Japan's trade relations are highly 
susceptible to political disruptions and that its locally-directed export economy very much relies on 
maintaining normal and favorable relations with its neighbors in the ASEAN+3 region.   
 The Japanese FTA with Indonesia is found to be positively correlated with Japanese exports to 
Indonesia; the same can be said about its FTA with Malaysia with regards to exports to Malaysia and its 
FTA with Vietnam with regards to exports to Vietnam. Interestingly, FTAs with its other major trading 
partners Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines are all found to be negatively associated with exports. 
In sum, the findings presented here for Japan suggest that sanction costs have had a major role in 
damaging Japanese market access over the last 20 years.  
 South Korean polity is found to be positively correlated with its export levels. All political-
economic variables bear a negative association with South Korean exports however. Maritime disputes 
with China in 1994 and Japan in 1999 are both found to have had a negative effect on South Korean 
exports to these two respective countries. Similarly, sanction costs borne to India and China for their 
import restrictions against Korean exports have been effective in explaining downward trends in South 
Korean exports to these countries. South Korean FTAs with India and Singapore are also negatively 




  The South Korean case certainly deserves additional investigation: its reliance on non-ASEAN 
markets may insulate it from many of the negative effects it experiences in its own region. Nevertheless, 
taken in aggregate, its market access in the ASEAN+3 region exceeds that of China and Japan.  
 Not much can be inferred from the Malaysian gravity model, except that an ongoing 
Singaporean export restriction from 1995 has had a damaging impact on Malaysian trade to Singapore. 
This is most likely due to a reciprocal set of restrictions enacted by Malaysia against Singapore. The roots 
of this conflict are outside the scope of this paper.  
 Malaysian FTAs with Japan and New Zealand have had mixed effects: Malaysian exports to 
Japan have worsened since the deal's inception in 2006. Exports to New Zealand have however 
improved  since their FTA's signing in 2010. Taken together with the sanction cost effects above, 
Malaysia suffers from relatively poor market access compared to its neighbors, although it is in nearly 
the same standing as Indonesia in this regard.  
 New Zealand's polity has complemented its export volume to the ASEAN+3 region. Its relations 
with the countries in this region have been very normal however, so not much can be said about 
sanction cost or dyad hostility effects. Its FTA with Australia stands out however: it bears a negative 
effect on New Zealand's trade to Australia. Among the five FTAs investigated for New Zealand, only this 
coefficient stands-out as statistically significant.  
 The Philippines polity is also found to complement its exports in the ASEAN+3 region. This 
country has experienced hostilities between the early 90s and the late 2000s with Vietnam, Taiwan, and 
China; however, only dyad hostilities with China are found to have a statistically significant and negative 
effect on bilateral trade. As presented above, these hostilities have been sporadic, ongoing, and 
territorial in nature, amongst the fiercest in the region. The country's FTA with Japan - signed in 2008 - is 




  The Philippines suffers from the poorest market access score relative to other markets in the 
ASEAN+3 region, if we exclude New Zealand from the analysis. Its poor market access may in fact be 
partly due to its highly strained relations with China.   
 Singapore is the second of the two countries whose polity is negatively correlated with exports 
to the ASEAN+3 region. Sanction costs to the sender of sanctions are also all found to all bear negative 
correlations to exports with sanctioning partner countries. In particular, Indonesian import restrictions 
on Singaporean goods are indeed correlated with lower Singaporean exports to Indonesia in the model. 
Furthermore, Singaporean export restrictions on the Malaysian economy, bear their expected negative 
effect on Singaporean exports to Malaysia as well.  
 Singaporean FTAs with Australia and New Zealand are found to positively affect Singaporean 
exports to these countries, whereas FTAs with China and Japan have the opposite negative effect. These 
differences may have their roots in the legacy of imperial ties with the U.K.  
 The model for Thailand finds all coefficients on political-economic variables to be statistically 
significant. Hostilities with Vietnam in 1995 are plausibly represented by the negative sign on dyad 
hostility with Vietnam. This particular conflict has its roots in a border dispute along a portion of the 
Mekong River. Moreover, sanction costs to the sender of the sanction are negative in the case of 
Thailand's trade relationship with Malaysia. This negative effect follows from the South Thailand 
Insurgency of 2006-2007 in which fugitives of the Thai state fled to Malaysia during a coup attempt. 
Lastly, FTA's honored by the Thai government are all shown to have a statistically positive effect on 
trade with the exception of trade with Japan. It is possible that Thai-Japanese trade may need to 
account for flooding occurring in 2011 which severely damaged Japanese automobile manufacturing 




  Taiwan's polity is found to be uncorrelated with its export flows to the ASEAN+3 region, which is 
telling given the dynamic nature of its polity score over the study time-period. Polity may only have an 
effect on matters of domestic civil society. Hostilities with China, Japan, and the Philippines however are 
all found to have negatively affected Taiwanese exports to these countries. All of these hostilities can 
trace their roots to some form of territory dispute, many of these occurring across islands in the East 
and South China Seas.  Sanction costs to the sender of sanctions also bear negative effects on Taiwan's 
economy: Taiwan's restriction of Japanese imports in 1994 is correlated to a lowered trend of Taiwanese 
exports to Japan. Turning to the matter of FTAs, these agreements are not legally recognized for Taiwan 
given its classification as a semi-autonomous region within the PRC.  
 Taken together, political-economic effects have not adversely affected Taiwan's market access 
standing in the ASEAN+3 region. In fact, Taiwan ranks third, just behind Australia and Thailand, if we 
exclude Vietnam as an outlier.  
 
Conclusion 
 The analysis undertaken in this thesis has sought to test the theoretical correlation between 
wages and market access, as argued by Venables in his 2004 paper. Indeed, political-economic and 
geographic effects all bear plausible signs in the gravity model while also maintaining theoretical 
consistency - i.e. positive market access effects on wages. The degree to which market access changes 
country to country in the Asia-Pacific is of particular interest, and these rankings can be explained by the 
coefficients on political-economic variables estimated in the 1st stage gravity model. Moreover, 
estimates of bilateral transportation/trade costs can be produced within this framework using the wide 
array of political-economic and geographic information available on public databases. Predicted 




 framework practical for intraregional spatial economic inference since symmetry conditions will differ 
across different country pairings. Therefore, this methodology may be attractive in any policy analysis 
that is international in scope. 
 Unlike many other reduced form estimations carried out by other authors for testing Venables' 
theory, the method proposed in this paper uses the Venables structural wage equation directly in a FIML 
estimation routine. This structural equation has its roots in NEG theory, in which wages take on a 
structural form with theoretical underpinnings in imperfect competition and IRS: these models assume 
monopolistic competition over space and the existence of composite commodities that are produced 
under increasing returns to scale - assumptions that are suitable in a macroscopic setting illustrated in 
this paper. Since heterogeneous functional forms of gravity are constructed for each country with 
respect to its trade partners, the use of a structural wage equation also implies that technology 
parameters of the IRS production function are heterogeneous across countries - another useful 
implication for avoiding unnecessary international generalizations.  
 Several refinements can be made to the methodology posed in this paper, an obvious one being 
the inclusion of country-specific CPIs, so as to proxy for multilateral price indices. If CPI figures are not 
available, one could also use cross-country GDP deflators instead of CPI since real GDP and nominal GDP 
are derived from CPI figures. Furthermore, Thisse suggests modeling prices in the inverse demand 
function in a game-theoretic setting, in which Bertrand competition determines equilibrium prices. This 
theoretical structure would draw from a quasilinear utility specification, which is attractive for breaking 
utility components into interacting consumption bundles.   
 Consistency should also be achieved with previous studies utilizing the reduced form OLS fixed-
effects approach to estimation. Venables and Knapp in particular consistently estimate the coefficient 




 between 6 and 10 and a cost share on labor inputs of around 0.4 to 0.6. Presently, the results in this 
paper have reported market access coefficients assuming a near perfect elasticity of substitution and 
cost shares on labor inputs of around 0.9. The inclusion of price index information would also do much 
to alleviate any measurement errors caused by a nonsensical placeholder for supply access; however, on 
the same token, simultaneity problems between supply access and market access would then need to 
be addressed with an instrumentation strategy. 
 It should also be noted that since parameter estimates on distances are sometimes non-negative, 
alternative approaches to obtaining the global maximum of the likelihood estimation are suggested. 
Wymer and Donaghy suggest using a genetic algorithm that will identify optimal initial parameter 
values, from which a switch over to MLE will yield global maxima of parameters in MLE. This genetic 
algorithm approach is a combinatorial process and as such would offer a complete exploration of the 
response surface of the likelihood function to changes in the parameters. Once the genetic algorithm 
switches to a Newtonian algorithm, one would be in the neighborhood of a true global maximum 
likelihood solution. 
 Some other critics also note that the estimation method provided in this thesis benefits from 
large degrees of freedom, a feature which should be leveraged. Typically, one needs to use as many 
observations as one has independent variables. As there is no crunch on degrees of freedom with the 
current number of equations specified in the model’s partial equilibrium, one would have room to factor 
include relationships outside the dyad to other regional trade partners. The addition of variables from 





  Some further considerations regarding the quality of data have also been suggested. Dyadic 
distances are currently calculated from rhumb lines. Given that all trade in the ASEAN area occurs along 
discrete sea lines, it is feasible to calculate exact network distances using data on these shipping lines.  
 Last but not least, the transport cost measures calculated in this thesis should be imputed into 
an NEG model in order to make economic inferences on the nature of agglomeration between any given 
country-pair. Since transport costs are uniquely identified for each country in the Asia-Pacific, this 
exercise may yield predictive implications on future migration patterns and firm location decisions 
within the region. The careful use of the tools prescribed in this thesis can then be a powerful means to 










































TABLE 1: TRANSPORT COSTS
Freeness of Trade ф Australia China Indonesia India Japan Korea Malaysia New Zealand Philippines Singapore Thailand Taiwan Vietnam
Australia 0.974130 0.919036 0.508431 0.811417 0.752152 0.022227 0.262963 2.065E-23
China 0.063490 0.001105 0.929992 0.156357 0.003077 0.120995 0.998153 0.000104
Indonesia 0.153272 0.993867 0.987799 0.126131 0.001008 0.972221 0.003336 0.111107 0.998128 0.949430 0.244430
India 0.112401 0.951026 0.292475 0.770987 0.000690 0.516318 0.375916 0.969128 0.360483 0.007736
Japan 0.112335 0.982939 0.054624 0.316356 0.000008
Korea 0.616132 0.980110 0.867014 0.810310 0.218060 0.558367 0.674472 0.107527
Malaysia 0.971102 0.990806 0.294731 0.739018 0.026125 0.538335 0.880254 0.943625 0.011050
New Zealand 0.562351 0.955524 0.473367 0.685292 0.664762 0.559429 0.105922
Philippines 0.000237 0.208697 0.908428 0.847919 0.000210 0.272908 0.998095 0.174389 0.158340
Singapore 0.981601 0.961607 0.160832 0.780339 0.051117 0.750940 0.997934 0.045607 0.440987
Thailand 0.122608 0.982454 0.020304 0.943750 0.206680 0.762867 0.008831 0.037030 0.900118
Taiwan 0.597918 0.996428 0.351353 0.828565 0.772355 0.041356 0.986128 0.998094
Vietnam 0.133770 0.085639 0.756603 0.968766 0.000010 0.437815 0.998713 0.563701




















Statistically significant at the 5% level
Variable not in model
FIGURE 3. AUSTRALIA


































Statistically significant at the 5% level
Variable not in model
FIGURE 5. INDONESIA


































Statistically significant at the 5% level
Variable not in model
FIGURE 7. JAPAN


































Statistically significant at the 5% level
Variable not in model
FIGURE 9. MALAYSIA














FIGURE 10. NEW ZEALAND



















Statistically significant at the 5% level
Variable not in model
FIGURE 11. PHILIPPINES


































Statistically significant at the 5% level
Variable not in model
FIGURE 13. THAILAND
















































gm12 0.040078 0.015037 2.67
gm13 0.107990 0.044131 2.45
gm14 0.247477 0.060378 4.1
gm15 -0.002950 0.001521 1.94
gm16 -0.001175 0.000456 2.57
gm17 -0.002004 0.000981 2.04
gm18 0.121461 0.042202 2.88
gm19 0.082651 0.041187 2.01
gm110 0.100535 0.031636 3.18
gm111 -0.001182 0.000748 1.58
gm112 0.011401 0.009524 1.2
gm113 0.286683 0.043384 6.61
eta -0.000816 0.000271 3.02
theta 3.298045 0.226779 14.54
psi 0.541936 0.010303 52.6
zeta 14.923277 0.565975 26.37
sigma 1.152338 0.002119 543.76
kpy1 2.825423 0.004993 565.91
ksu1 -0.091395 0.081782 1.12
kwto1 -23.909489 0.178765 133.75
kasn1 -0.289300 0.108898 2.66
kd12 0.763948 2.645160 0.29
kd13 0.754460 0.360905 2.09
kd15 4.023363 0.266865 15.08
ks13 1.045422 0.510318 2.05
ks14 -0.574160 0.149360 3.84
kln14 -1.450748 0.154581 9.39
kln16 -7.205607 1.661795 4.34
kln18 -3.029162 0.364327 8.31
kln19 -5.131640 1.872478 2.74




kf17 -9.222777 0.849102 10.86
kf110 0.659568 0.263606 2.5
kf111 1.963116 0.239048 8.21
nu1 -0.189266 0.025176 7.52
rho 18.124485 1.859425 9.75
xi12 2.645449 0.361150 7.33
xi13 1.900442 0.227029 8.37
xi14 2.768608 0.032770 84.49
xi15 0.841370 0.650505 1.29
xi16 -0.206937 0.215306 0.96
xi17 -0.153540 0.342727 0.45
xi18 2.323957 0.235353 9.87
xi19 1.639056 0.444666 3.69
xi110 0.091423 0.157501 0.58
xi111 -1.291070 0.189275 6.82
xi112 0.906056 0.200460 4.52
xi113 2.993407 0.020510 145.95
dl12 -1.919625 0.259498 7.4
dl13 -1.231957 0.157798 7.81
dl14 -1.786580 0.012296 145.3
dl15 -1.151998 0.446793 2.58
dl16 -1.153698 0.132198 8.73
dl17 -1.037418 0.090931 11.41
dl18 -0.860179 0.093178 9.23
dl19 -0.369503 0.015106 24.46
dl110 0.532989 0.051918 10.27
dl111 -1.331114 0.040335 33
dl112 -0.381181 0.007866 48.46
dl113 -1.496700 0.027486 54.45
dis11 0.576268 0.013597 42.38
FIGURE 17. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: AUSTRALIA
Log-Likelihood 3349.683
Norm of Gradient 0.001399
Condition Number of Hessian 15400000
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 2129.956
Market Access Effect 1.601298
Freeness of Trade ф(1,2) 0.063490
Freeness of Trade ф(1,3) 0.153272
Freeness of Trade ф(1,4) 0.112401
Freeness of Trade ф(1,5) 0.112335
Freeness of Trade ф(1,6) 0.616132
Freeness of Trade ф(1,7) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(1,8) 0.562351
Freeness of Trade ф(1,9) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(1,10) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(1,11) 0.122608
Freeness of Trade ф(1,12) 0.597918




gm21 0.002227 0.000131 17.05
gm23 0.002042 0.000119 17.13
gm24 0.007376 0.000187 39.44
gm25 0.001109 0.000096 11.51
gm26 0.001075 0.000081 13.19
gm27 0.003025 0.000234 12.92
gm28 0.001540 0.000111 13.91
gm29 0.002132 0.000142 15.02
gm210 0.002158 0.000200 10.78
gm211 0.001916 0.000229 8.35
gm212 0.001755 0.000034 52.01
gm213 0.003354 0.000051 66.14
eta -0.004600 0.000227 20.27
theta -62.957488 17.410566 3.62
psi 0.997291 0.013223 75.42
zeta -2.863478 0.025497 112.31
sigma 1.003847 0.018820 53.34
kpy2 2.506610 0.020919 119.82
kwto2 7.398293 2.039616 3.63
kasn2 -10.996197 1.664974 6.6
kd21 2.893992 1.971049 1.47
kd23 0.207564 0.522990 0.4
kd25 3.853446 0.522680 7.37
kd26 11.014357 1.878299 5.86
kd29 -3.170632 1.029697 3.08
kd212 -2.253242 0.046091 48.89
kd213 2.321464 0.049107 47.27
ks23 -1.003165 17.141720 0.06
ks24 -2.140432 1.958521 1.09
ks25 1.302264 0.020632 63.12
ks26 -3.268410 0.008520 383.62
ks213 -1.549510 0.022158 69.93




kln210 0.001826 0.007776 0.23
kln212 -0.235518 0.005788 40.69
kf28 11.328720 0.136430 83.04
kf210 -2.587827 0.017279 149.77
nu2 6.267480 0.005265 1190.45
rho 0.126327 0.000658 191.89
xi21 0.000848 0.000016 54.54
xi23 0.000041 0.000000 144.94
xi24 -0.000471 0.000003 145.61
xi25 -0.001910 0.000010 195.17
xi26 0.000011 0.000001 10.67
xi27 0.000012 0.000001 11.56
xi28 -0.000849 0.000008 111.74
xi29 0.000000 0.000003 0.01
xi210 -0.000136 0.000002 57.31
xi211 -0.000023 0.000002 10.85
xi212 -0.000747 0.000006 117.68
xi213 0.003094 0.000027 116.33
dl21 -0.433967 0.001522 285.09
dl23 -0.283310 0.002421 117.04
dl24 -1.841924 0.007925 232.41
dl25 0.089993 0.000796 112.99
dl26 0.357345 0.002063 173.23
dl27 -0.961091 0.003131 306.93
dl28 -0.053740 0.000400 134.25
dl29 -0.114832 0.001733 66.28
dl210 -0.891159 0.008254 107.97
dl211 -0.575007 0.009892 58.13
dl212 0.724829 0.014638 49.52
dl213 0.191937 0.006926 27.71
dt24 -0.176736 0.000824 214.51
dt213 -0.024260 0.000987 24.58
dis22 0.000010 0.000000 3875.55
FIGURE 18. FIML RESULTS: CHINA
FIGURE 19. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: CHINA
Log-Likelihood 3101.18
Norm of Gradient 0.032597
Condition Number of Hessian 3.35E+18
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 1881.452
Market Access Effect 0.998874
Freeness of Trade ф(2,1) 0.974130
Freeness of Trade ф(2,3) 0.993867
Freeness of Trade ф(2,4) 0.951026
Freeness of Trade ф(2,5) 0.982939
Freeness of Trade ф(2,6) 0.980110
Freeness of Trade ф(2,7) 0.971102
Freeness of Trade ф(2,8) 0.955524
Freeness of Trade ф(2,9) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(2,10) 0.981601
Freeness of Trade ф(2,11) 0.982454
Freeness of Trade ф(2,12) 1




gm31 -0.000192 0.000071 2.7
gm32 -0.000462 0.000133 3.48
gm34 -0.000076 0.000025 3.05
gm35 -0.000465 0.000688 0.68
gm36 -0.000164 0.000045 3.65
gm37 -0.000223 0.000046 4.81
gm38 -0.000064 0.000060 1.05
gm39 -0.000493 0.000140 3.52
gm310 -0.000296 0.000099 2.98
gm311 -0.000380 0.000080 4.78
gm312 -0.000145 0.000051 2.85
gm313 -0.000143 0.000067 2.12
eta 0.000863 0.000395 2.19
theta 77.963812 2.420434 32.21
psi 0.957712 0.008845 108.28
zeta 6.071979 0.530312 11.45
sigma 1.067761 0.013849 77.1
kpy3 0.791637 0.027855 28.42
ksu3 -14.691695 3.500928 4.2
kwto3 -14.386152 0.276301 52.07
kasn3 -0.660923 0.359333 1.84
kd31 -75.649856 3.184499 23.76
kd32 -121.668707 2.305942 52.76
kd38 -18.860428 4.878184 3.87
ks31 3.389720 0.206421 16.42
ks32 88.931044 2.959031 30.05
ks35 -70.720420 3.483423 20.3
ks36 54.779727 2.126226 25.76
ks310 73.985250 4.353866 16.99
kln37 -9.765779 0.620219 15.75




kln310 4.598583 0.500042 9.2
kf35 9.352881 0.318781 29.34
nu3 -24.083521 0.607601 39.64
rho 36.827127 0.793889 46.39
xi31 19.076850 0.811310 23.51
xi32 1.081813 0.048428 22.34
xi34 -26.861651 1.384545 19.4
xi35 7.751295 0.392078 19.77
xi36 1.628219 1.565717 1.04
xi37 18.492836 1.177868 15.7
xi38 -0.308542 0.013229 23.32
xi39 -8.401804 0.316420 26.55
xi310 14.716526 1.401275 10.5
xi311 -0.141590 0.199192 0.71
xi312 11.516671 1.523095 7.56
xi313 -24.875435 1.376578 18.07
dl31 -13.892925 0.452507 30.7
dl32 8.013078 0.590271 13.58
dl34 -52.915993 2.244731 23.57
dl35 -2.144504 0.334362 6.41
dl36 -1.073258 0.472830 2.27
dl37 -14.881862 0.488617 30.46
dl38 -22.490051 0.829472 27.11
dl39 15.659284 1.058190 14.8
dl310 0.942085 0.085259 11.05
dl311 7.427301 0.716123 10.37
dl312 -8.190069 0.238455 34.35
dl313 -8.835319 0.487459 18.13
dt37 -4.160604 0.105341 39.5
dis33 0.295754 0.000079 3737.72
FIGURE 21. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: INDONESIA
Log-Likelihood 2.97E+03
Norm of Gradient 2.30E-02
Condition Number of Hessian 3.82E+08
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 1.75E+03
Market Access Effect 0.977892
Freeness of Trade ф(3,1) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(3,2) 0.001105
Freeness of Trade ф(3,4) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(3,5) 0.054624
Freeness of Trade ф(3,6) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(3,7) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(3,8) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(3,9) 0.000237
Freeness of Trade ф(3,10) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(3,11) 0.020304
Freeness of Trade ф(3,12) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(3,13) 1




gm41 -0.000643 0.000194 3.32
gm42 -0.001222 0.000464 2.63
gm43 -0.000955 0.000277 3.44
gm45 -0.000231 0.000117 1.98
gm46 -0.000642 0.000256 2.51
gm47 -0.000930 0.000278 3.34
gm48 -0.000995 0.000518 1.92
gm49 -0.000965 0.000321 3.01
gm410 -0.000976 0.000388 2.52
gm411 -0.000642 0.000235 2.73
gm412 -0.000687 0.000358 1.92
gm413 -0.002005 0.000490 4.09
eta 0.010064 0.002595 3.88
theta 21.517396 0.477155 45.1
psi 0.977575 0.004491 217.66
zeta -0.006839 0.009449 0.72
sigma 1.011406 0.002254 448.71
kpy4 -0.856609 0.007401 115.74
ksu4 0.409973 0.231582 1.77
kwto4 -0.581605 0.005287 110.01
kasn4 15.994756 0.324542 49.28
ks41 4.750817 1.031737 4.6
ks42 0.578849 0.079526 7.28
ks45 -29.664103 0.261398 113.48
ks46 -3.960059 0.076218 51.96
kln41 -0.409397 0.001753 233.6
kln46 -0.008238 0.001817 4.53
kln48 -0.004431 0.000832 5.33
kln49 0.238503 0.001693 140.9




kf46 -0.672958 0.269323 2.5
nu4 -4.655547 0.007654 608.25
rho -0.497564 0.014162 35.13
xi41 0.703971 0.008557 82.27
xi42 -0.388464 0.006877 56.49
xi43 -0.844391 0.006431 131.31
xi45 -0.280425 0.007980 35.14
xi46 -1.528701 0.006393 239.11
xi47 0.200100 0.008248 24.26
xi48 2.946456 0.005869 502
xi49 -0.502254 0.006517 77.07
xi410 0.579189 0.006894 84.02
xi411 0.006767 0.002903 2.33
xi412 -0.495881 0.007012 70.72
xi413 0.908277 0.008952 101.47
dl41 -0.334019 0.006632 50.37
dl42 -0.606868 0.005351 113.41
dl43 -0.127699 0.007554 16.91
dl45 -0.518487 0.006941 74.7
dl46 0.127719 0.009992 12.78
dl47 -0.098860 0.002775 35.63
dl48 0.133667 0.004193 31.88
dl49 0.107739 0.007869 13.69
dl410 -0.411235 0.006778 60.67
dl411 -0.641921 0.003858 166.37
dl412 -0.037284 0.001350 27.62
dl413 0.239044 0.003221 74.22
dt42 0.720980 0.006013 119.91
dis44 0.229618 0.000380 603.89
FIGURE 23. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: INDIA
Log-Likelihood 2805.213
Norm of Gradient 0.004126
Condition Number of Hessian 17000000
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 1585.485
Market Access Effect 1.011403
Freeness of Trade ф(4,1) 0.919036
Freeness of Trade ф(4,2) 0.929992
Freeness of Trade ф(4,3) 0.987799
Freeness of Trade ф(4,5) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(4,6) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(4,7) 0.990806
Freeness of Trade ф(4,8) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(4,9) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(4,10) 0.961607
Freeness of Trade ф(4,11) 0.943750
Freeness of Trade ф(4,12) 0.996428
Freeness of Trade ф(4,13) 1




gm51 -0.001741 0.001285 1.35
gm52 -0.001755 0.000510 3.44
gm53 -0.000681 0.000524 1.3
gm54 -0.001728 0.000768 2.25
gm56 -0.013167 0.002855 4.61
gm57 -0.001019 0.000722 1.41
gm58 -0.000779 0.001900 0.41
gm59 -0.000948 0.000492 1.93
gm510 -0.000395 0.000405 0.98
gm511 -0.001045 0.000534 1.96
gm512 -0.000781 0.000558 1.4
gm513 -0.001701 0.000465 3.66
eta 0.000237 0.000240 0.99
theta 2.743512 0.496667 5.52
psi 0.930724 0.007705 120.79
zeta 0.069746 0.034343 2.03
sigma 1.085118 0.004392 247.09
kpy5 0.844297 0.051969 16.25
kwto5 0.175572 0.035205 4.99
kasn5 0.639017 0.058030 11.01
kd51 -0.244582 0.075693 3.23
kd52 0.167682 0.071385 2.35
kd56 -0.982071 0.030239 32.48
kd512 -1.275659 0.056018 22.77
ks52 0.346409 0.041700 8.31
ks53 -1.422875 0.346540 4.11
ks54 -0.748328 0.150794 4.96
ks56 -0.515955 0.101847 5.07
ks512 -0.294970 0.039576 7.45
kf53 0.016997 0.004201 4.05




kf59 -0.107843 0.015464 6.97
kf510 -0.061835 0.006754 9.16
kf511 -0.001903 0.000934 2.04
kf513 0.006964 0.004931 1.41
nu5 0.246170 0.020708 11.89
rho -0.159904 0.035103 4.56
xi51 -0.004304 0.003952 1.09
xi52 0.201444 0.030061 6.7
xi53 0.131453 0.027923 4.71
xi54 0.264267 0.027173 9.73
xi56 0.118635 0.021595 5.49
xi57 -0.049569 0.022634 2.19
xi58 -0.049205 0.034537 1.42
xi59 0.086939 0.003004 28.95
xi510 0.092891 0.022381 4.15
xi511 0.267361 0.021687 12.33
xi512 -0.104556 0.024911 4.2
xi513 0.195118 0.026967 7.24
dl51 -0.913681 0.060106 15.2
dl52 -2.805150 0.126738 22.13
dl53 -2.988690 0.222581 13.43
dl54 -1.746136 0.098859 17.66
dl56 -0.462873 0.118357 3.91
dl57 -1.641555 0.102455 16.02
dl58 -0.962893 0.292498 3.29
dl59 -2.316881 0.100122 23.14
dl510 -2.518150 0.103674 24.29
dl511 -2.207007 0.058739 37.57
dl512 -1.819379 0.062037 29.33
dl513 -3.490689 0.078154 44.66
dis55 0.302401 0.002731 110.71
FIGURE 25. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: JAPAN
Log-Likelihood 2759.233
Norm of Gradient 0.012913
Condition Number of Hessian 1.08E+33
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 1539.506
Market Access Effect 0.990152
Freeness of Trade ф(5,1) 0.508431
Freeness of Trade ф(5,2) 0.156357
Freeness of Trade ф(5,3) 0.126131
Freeness of Trade ф(5,4) 0.292475
Freeness of Trade ф(5,6) 0.867014
Freeness of Trade ф(5,7) 0.294731
Freeness of Trade ф(5,8) 0.473367
Freeness of Trade ф(5,9) 0.208697
Freeness of Trade ф(5,10) 0.160832
Freeness of Trade ф(5,11) 0.206680
Freeness of Trade ф(5,12) 0.351353
Freeness of Trade ф(5,13) 0.085639




gm61 0.000355 0.000120 2.96
gm62 0.004443 0.002101 2.11
gm63 0.000339 0.000137 2.48
gm64 0.000537 0.000198 2.72
gm65 0.000197 0.000158 1.25
gm67 0.000416 0.000117 3.54
gm68 0.000318 0.000125 2.54
gm69 0.000454 0.000095 4.8
gm610 0.000339 0.000138 2.45
gm611 0.000313 0.000128 2.44
gm612 0.000359 0.000132 2.72
gm613 0.003604 0.001411 2.55
eta -0.001765 0.000824 2.14
theta -0.169105 0.003103 54.51
psi 0.745146 0.159273 4.68
zeta 0.045378 0.006693 6.78
sigma 1.336325 0.110806 12.06
kpy6 0.105242 0.014154 7.44
kwto6 0.033927 0.003467 9.79
kasn6 0.092349 0.007485 12.34
kd62 -30.357922 0.888589 34.16
kd65 -1.016379 0.028016 36.28
ks62 -1.209622 0.029669 40.77
ks63 19.754665 60.444125 0.33
ks64 -1.760643 0.031103 56.61
ks65 -109.232970 61.021031 1.79
kln61 -0.007576 0.000321 23.63
kln64 0.011438 0.000071 161.78
kln68 -0.001941 0.000048 40.59




kln610 -0.000879 0.000033 26.99
kf64 -0.004192 0.001367 3.07
kf610 -0.018966 0.000289 65.72
nu6 10.743270 0.003435 3127.15
rho 0.096991 0.000103 941.5
xi61 0.000004 0.000000 94.1
xi62 -0.000746 0.000049 15.08
xi63 0.000473 0.000043 11.04
xi64 -0.000546 0.000154 3.55
xi65 -0.000395 0.000007 53.7
xi67 -0.000301 0.000038 8
xi68 -0.000747 0.000099 7.57
xi69 -0.000307 0.000044 6.94
xi610 0.000014 0.000065 0.21
xi611 -0.000528 0.000030 17.54
xi612 -0.000256 0.000038 6.76
xi613 -0.000774 0.000022 35.13
dl61 -0.069870 0.000787 88.75
dl62 -0.091473 0.000398 229.76
dl63 -0.089171 0.000282 316.55
dl64 -0.095012 0.000059 1609.77
dl65 -0.059873 0.001079 55.49
dl67 -0.107134 0.000030 3531.21
dl68 -0.122549 0.000041 2986.68
dl69 -0.035564 0.000140 254.53
dl610 -0.089720 0.000035 2587.15
dl611 -0.097956 0.000069 1428.32
dl612 -0.076318 0.000021 3700.87
dl613 -0.102525 0.000019 5384.29
dis66 -0.000194 0.000000 390.38
FIGURE 27. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: KOREA
Log-Likelihood 3842.202
Norm of Gradient 0.017185
Condition Number of Hessian 1660000
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 2622.474
Market Access Effect 1.004261
Freeness of Trade ф(6,1) 0.811417
Freeness of Trade ф(6,2) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(6,3) 0.001008
Freeness of Trade ф(6,4) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(6,5) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(6,7) 0.739018
Freeness of Trade ф(6,8) 0.685292
Freeness of Trade ф(6,9) 0.908428
Freeness of Trade ф(6,10) 0.780339
Freeness of Trade ф(6,11) 0.762867
Freeness of Trade ф(6,12) 0.828565
Freeness of Trade ф(6,13) 0.756603




gm71 0.000082 0.000023 3.57
gm72 0.000111 0.000024 4.68
gm73 0.000095 0.000031 3.1
gm74 0.000081 0.000038 2.11
gm75 0.000051 0.000018 2.89
gm76 0.000055 0.000026 2.07
gm78 0.000091 0.000053 1.72
gm79 0.000063 0.000025 2.47
gm710 0.000050 0.000016 3.08
gm711 0.000074 0.000019 3.82
gm712 0.000061 0.000021 2.87
gm713 0.000153 0.000042 3.67
eta 0.015569 0.010735 1.45
theta -82.220258 2.366235 34.75
psi 0.958728 0.008301 115.49
zeta 3.544984 0.237414 14.93
sigma 1.071805 0.013915 77.02
kpy7 -0.320712 0.421627 0.76
kwto7 5.899517 1.121249 5.26
kasn7 3.919299 1.181266 3.32
ks710 -38.523194 4.051305 9.51
ks711 0.862970 0.539502 1.6
kln72 -0.021325 0.034754 0.61
kln73 -0.653350 0.211663 3.09
kln710 1.342264 0.224847 5.97
kln712 0.024636 0.013414 1.84
kf71 3.020895 3.563405 0.85
kf75 -3.041108 0.481000 6.32
kf78 3.889132 1.279667 3.04




rho 0.089299 0.041514 2.15
xi71 0.000054 0.000016 3.33
xi72 0.000003 0.000006 0.55
xi73 -0.000095 0.000046 2.06
xi74 0.000032 0.000013 2.37
xi75 -0.000036 0.000021 1.72
xi76 -0.000002 0.000008 0.25
xi78 0.000026 0.000017 1.47
xi79 0.000036 0.000018 1.94
xi710 0.000081 0.000062 1.3
xi711 0.000023 0.000018 1.33
xi712 0.000038 0.000016 2.4
xi713 -0.000129 0.000059 2.2
dl71 -0.108524 0.023523 4.61
dl72 0.012916 0.107310 0.12
dl73 -0.138030 0.054669 2.52
dl74 -0.442172 0.063770 6.93
dl75 0.311691 0.056857 5.48
dl76 -0.348994 0.090259 3.87
dl78 -0.198341 0.186178 1.07
dl79 -0.297188 0.060786 4.89
dl710 0.639265 0.224349 2.85
dl711 0.291106 0.117904 2.47
dl712 -0.446817 0.229212 1.95
dl713 -0.061241 0.088030 0.7
dt73 0.055297 0.216097 0.26
dt710 -1.324687 0.226158 5.86
dt711 0.296932 0.071040 4.18
dis77 0.000062 0.000012 5.05
FIGURE 29. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: MALAYSIA
Log-Likelihood 3133.432
Norm of Gradient 0.021785
Condition Number of Hessian 1.91E+12
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 1913.704
Market Access Effect 0.973169
Freeness of Trade ф(7,1) 0.752152
Freeness of Trade ф(7,2) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(7,3) 0.972221
Freeness of Trade ф(7,4) 0.770987
Freeness of Trade ф(7,5) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(7,6) 0.810310
Freeness of Trade ф(7,8) 0.664762
Freeness of Trade ф(7,9) 0.847919
Freeness of Trade ф(7,10) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(7,11) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(7,12) 0.772355
Freeness of Trade ф(7,13) 0.968766




gm81 0.160758 0.209493 0.77
gm82 0.222446 0.536113 0.41
gm83 0.199388 1.350027 0.15
gm84 0.093922 0.394630 0.24
gm85 0.140969 0.121138 1.16
gm86 0.298491 1.668300 0.18
gm87 0.258973 1.940111 0.13
gm89 -0.001205 0.020550 0.06
gm810 0.147773 0.033673 4.39
gm811 0.228039 0.836693 0.27
gm812 0.151021 0.117966 1.28
gm813 -0.002061 0.002938 0.7
eta 0.029580 0.062474 0.47
theta -0.445935 5.268803 0.08
psi 1.081107 0.194798 5.55
zeta -0.361166 0.099097 3.64
sigma 1.396099 0.520504 2.68
kpy8 0.315830 0.053583 5.89
kwto8 1.865026 1.805596 1.03
kasn8 2.023641 2.050748 0.99
kd83 0.017362 1.538428 0.01
kln81 0.387064 3.406559 0.11
kln84 -0.571730 22.710777 0.03
kln86 -2.167303 2.484101 0.87
kln89 0.664775 7.448153 0.09
kln810 -2.040573 21.325976 0.1
kf81 -1.608989 0.734797 2.19
kf82 0.824001 8.617405 0.1




kf810 -0.042744 5.771497 0.01
kf811 0.350709 4.045048 0.09
nu8 1.293657 1.399457 0.92
rho 2.274005 7.055705 0.32
xi81 0.926301 0.924213 1
xi82 0.927371 1.292113 0.72
xi83 1.027690 1.404122 0.73
xi84 1.595398 3.693758 0.43
xi85 -2.351020 0.636832 3.69
xi86 0.061768 0.157773 0.39
xi87 0.052543 1.007662 0.05
xi89 -0.845485 0.452772 1.87
xi810 0.661487 4.479471 0.15
xi811 0.512913 1.078467 0.48
xi812 -0.029265 0.498171 0.06
xi813 -0.248508 2.659987 0.09
dl81 -1.368624 0.650395 2.1
dl82 -1.581322 0.810157 1.95
dl83 -1.608373 1.163208 1.38
dl84 -2.014701 0.270032 7.46
dl85 1.420966 0.249656 5.69
dl86 -0.654592 0.132666 4.93
dl87 -0.967996 0.839087 1.15
dl89 -2.303910 1.572824 1.46
dl810 -1.060528 0.451249 2.35
dl811 -1.263185 0.080676 15.66
dl812 -0.883194 0.012212 72.32
dl813 -3.180318 0.263190 12.08
dis88 0.239922 0.002046 117.24
FIGURE 31. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: NEW ZEALAND
Log-Likelihood 3132.618
Norm of Gradient 0.002832
Condition Number of Hessian 59900000
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 1912.891
Market Access Effect 0.662545
Freeness of Trade ф(8,1) 0.022227
Freeness of Trade ф(8,2) 0.003077
Freeness of Trade ф(8,3) 0.003336
Freeness of Trade ф(8,4) 0.000690
Freeness of Trade ф(8,5) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(8,6) 0.218060
Freeness of Trade ф(8,7) 0.026125
Freeness of Trade ф(8,9) 0.000210
Freeness of Trade ф(8,10) 0.051117
Freeness of Trade ф(8,11) 0.008831
Freeness of Trade ф(8,12) 0.041356
Freeness of Trade ф(8,13) 0.000010




gm91 -0.005665 0.006102 0.93
gm92 0.005143 0.001939 2.65
gm93 -0.001076 0.000602 1.79
gm94 0.458660 0.149534 3.07
gm95 -0.001142 0.000352 3.24
gm96 -0.000492 0.000239 2.06
gm97 -0.000721 0.000346 2.08
gm98 0.141193 0.035538 3.97
gm910 0.165114 0.076276 2.16
gm911 0.249659 0.046604 5.36
gm912 0.013701 0.003815 3.59
gm913 0.248007 0.075494 3.29
eta -0.000004 0.000042 0.09
theta -2.103429 1.751619 1.2
psi 0.982123 0.010255 95.77
zeta 1.159924 0.336931 3.44
sigma 1.092611 0.009517 93.79
kpy9 1.465461 0.098132 14.93
kwto9 -3.147678 0.160924 19.56
kasn9 -2.493474 0.153086 16.29
kd92 -1.437739 0.234395 6.13
kd912 -15.012393 9.008294 1.67
kd913 -0.113041 0.486744 0.23
kln91 -0.424766 0.267596 1.59
kln94 -6.306576 0.304085 20.74
kln96 -0.056112 0.018655 3.01
kln98 -7.341289 0.232584 31.56




kf95 0.879555 0.274464 3.2
nu9 -4.930101 0.340299 14.49
rho -0.372713 0.190834 1.95
xi91 -2.104556 0.229780 9.16
xi92 2.665199 0.179813 14.82
xi93 -1.528552 0.185062 8.26
xi94 5.937746 0.091897 64.61
xi95 -0.224306 0.090523 2.48
xi96 -6.205380 0.123134 50.4
xi97 -1.807240 0.194710 9.28
xi98 8.547711 0.348525 24.53
xi910 5.423554 0.644860 8.41
xi911 11.219540 0.562788 19.94
xi912 2.323534 0.209791 11.08
xi913 4.931035 0.093245 52.88
dl91 3.463768 0.338650 10.23
dl92 1.577503 0.153758 10.26
dl93 0.394136 0.118140 3.34
dl94 -1.584394 0.030064 52.7
dl95 0.806096 0.096787 8.33
dl96 0.824108 0.077432 10.64
dl97 -0.864971 0.119320 7.25
dl98 -1.514253 0.087507 17.3
dl910 -0.378193 0.312658 1.21
dl911 -4.596028 0.424824 10.82
dl912 1.476053 0.026841 54.99
dl913 0.159355 0.094042 1.69
dis99 0.409969 0.004267 96.09
FIGURE 33. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: PHILIPPINES
Log-Likelihood 2360.257
Norm of Gradient 0.0112
Condition Number of Hessian 4680000000
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 1140.529
Market Access Effect 0.931898
Freeness of Trade ф(9,1) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(9,2) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(9,3) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(9,4) 0.516318
Freeness of Trade ф(9,5) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(9,6) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(9,7) 0.538335
Freeness of Trade ф(9,8) 0.559429
Freeness of Trade ф(9,10) 0.750940
Freeness of Trade ф(9,11) 0.037030
Freeness of Trade ф(9,12) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(9,13) 1




gm101 0.209394 0.052427 3.99
gm102 0.005478 0.001460 3.75
gm103 0.054052 0.000514 105.19
gm104 0.105455 0.041839 2.52
gm105 0.086687 0.033995 2.55
gm106 0.317503 0.048502 6.55
gm107 0.096694 0.028925 3.34
gm108 -0.000977 0.000540 1.81
gm109 -0.001991 0.000988 2.01
gm1011 0.045951 0.026769 1.72
gm1012 0.292347 0.056296 5.19
gm1013 0.067908 0.002877 23.6
eta -0.004752 0.001000 4.75
theta 5.027579 1.263956 3.98
psi 0.838679 0.024579 34.12
zeta 1.038022 0.352092 2.95
sigma 1.138588 0.011663 97.63
kpy10 -0.199467 0.038144 5.23
kwto10 1.461956 0.292382 5
kasn10 1.469680 0.294951 4.98
ks103 -4.632630 1.479535 3.13
ks107 -0.191353 0.097239 1.97
kln101 1.764602 0.476823 3.7
kln102 -1.291834 0.931711 1.39
kln103 0.730069 0.336019 2.17
kln104 -0.391597 0.373309 1.05
kln106 -1.628383 0.688919 2.36
kln107 -0.935916 0.187146 5
kln108 -0.205459 0.157486 1.3
kln109 0.851565 0.192324 4.43
kln1012 -1.059783 0.601891 1.76




kf102 -1.339328 0.200280 6.69
kf105 -0.264849 0.053306 4.97
kf106 0.058295 0.077542 0.75
kf108 1.459103 0.234622 6.22
nu10 1.214950 0.081906 14.83
rho 1.964280 0.576665 3.41
xi101 0.561271 0.217323 2.58
xi102 3.472206 0.287731 12.07
xi103 2.896007 0.426510 6.79
xi104 0.906354 0.173354 5.23
xi105 0.922794 0.180655 5.11
xi106 0.870303 0.012754 68.24
xi107 0.260355 0.201392 1.29
xi108 -2.982539 0.437737 6.81
xi109 -1.397822 0.165847 8.43
xi1011 -0.065469 0.211528 0.31
xi1012 0.025419 0.081882 0.31
xi1013 1.301886 0.396277 3.29
dl101 -0.848986 0.113480 7.48
dl102 -2.148401 0.170544 12.6
dl103 -2.854846 0.006268 455.46
dl104 -0.905666 0.116088 7.8
dl105 -1.002223 0.095152 10.53
dl106 -0.684171 0.003121 219.23
dl107 -0.184633 0.177026 1.04
dl108 -1.652707 0.107695 15.35
dl109 -1.094151 0.035427 30.88
dl1011 -0.104451 0.054808 1.91
dl1012 -0.144049 0.001352 106.51
dl1013 -0.816376 0.015956 51.17
dt107 0.898132 0.313401 2.87
dis1010 0.346764 0.018370 18.88
FIGURE 35. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: SINGAPORE
Log-Likelihood 2860.807
Norm of Gradient 0.003948
Condition Number of Hessian 598000000
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 1641.079
Market Access Effect 1.047220
Freeness of Trade ф(10,1) 0.262963
Freeness of Trade ф(10,2) 0.120995
Freeness of Trade ф(10,3) 0.111107
Freeness of Trade ф(10,4) 0.375916
Freeness of Trade ф(10,5) 0.316356
Freeness of Trade ф(10,6) 0.558367
Freeness of Trade ф(10,7) 0.880254
Freeness of Trade ф(10,8) 0.105922
Freeness of Trade ф(10,9) 0.272908
Freeness of Trade ф(10,11) 0.900118
Freeness of Trade ф(10,12) 0.986128
Freeness of Trade ф(10,13) 0.437815




gm111 0.001124 0.000165 6.83
gm112 0.001689 0.000258 6.55
gm113 0.001572 0.000133 11.86
gm114 0.001413 0.000071 19.92
gm115 0.000679 0.000052 13.05
gm116 0.001405 0.000132 10.67
gm117 0.001106 0.000069 16.15
gm118 0.001093 0.000066 16.46
gm119 0.001163 0.000083 14.07
gm1110 0.000678 0.000077 8.84
gm1112 0.000732 0.000048 15.24
gm1113 0.001979 0.000095 20.77
eta -0.002867 0.000532 5.39
theta -165.210230 30.564291 5.41
psi 0.666542 0.005560 119.87
zeta 2.560529 0.001234 2075.76
sigma 1.870345 0.005030 371.8
kpy11 0.305056 0.000048 6293.84
ksu11 10.085961 2.635133 3.83
kwto11 0.197642 0.064877 3.05
kasn11 0.191011 0.064877 2.94
kd1113 -4.308845 0.000868 4963.5
ks117 -26.005111 12.654171 2.06
kf111 0.626287 0.710561 0.88
kf115 -0.118318 0.236466 0.5
kf118 -3.383650 0.766798 4.41




rho 0.831155 0.000682 1218.73
xi111 -0.000487 0.000065 7.53
xi112 -0.001983 0.000047 42.54
xi113 -0.000636 0.000066 9.61
xi114 -0.000703 0.000121 5.79
xi115 -0.000787 0.000170 4.64
xi116 -0.001410 0.000075 18.68
xi117 -0.000534 0.000112 4.78
xi118 -0.000627 0.000102 6.17
xi119 -0.000281 0.000129 2.18
xi1110 -0.001274 0.000071 18.03
xi1112 -0.001999 0.000140 14.27
xi1113 -0.001777 0.000108 16.38
dl111 0.179219 0.000485 369.33
dl112 0.213532 0.000369 579.22
dl113 -0.040392 0.001607 25.14
dl114 0.092626 0.001319 70.2
dl115 -0.081082 0.000416 195.07
dl116 -1.276539 0.003300 386.87
dl117 -0.036847 0.002776 13.27
dl118 0.171867 0.000303 566.4
dl119 0.036185 0.000494 73.22
dl1110 0.115207 0.000596 193.25
dl1112 -0.040594 0.000520 78.02
dl1113 -0.014531 0.000417 34.87
dt117 0.202908 0.000049 4102.98
dis1111 -0.000002 0.000000 10.26
FIGURE 37. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: THAILAND
Log-Likelihood 3048.779
Norm of Gradient 0.034933
Condition Number of Hessian 1730000000
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 1829.051
Market Access Effect 1.216182
Freeness of Trade ф(11,1) 0.023901
Freeness of Trade ф(11,2) 0.788904
Freeness of Trade ф(11,3) 0.570683
Freeness of Trade ф(11,4) 0.683543
Freeness of Trade ф(11,5) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(11,6) 0.491891
Freeness of Trade ф(11,7) 0.591029
Freeness of Trade ф(11,8) 0.106701
Freeness of Trade ф(11,9) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(11,10) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(11,12) 0.234114
Freeness of Trade ф(11,13) 1




gm121 0.001046 0.000648 1.61
gm122 0.134218 0.030779 4.36
gm123 0.028941 0.020682 1.4
gm124 0.173841 0.044592 3.9
gm125 -0.001302 0.000723 1.8
gm126 -0.000854 0.000283 3.02
gm127 -0.005179 0.001717 3.02
gm128 0.150018 0.058205 2.58
gm129 -0.002151 0.001069 2.01
gm1210 -0.002879 0.000764 3.77
gm1211 0.041514 0.014974 2.77
gm1213 0.172649 0.018474 9.35
eta 0.042768 0.007710 5.55
theta -23.897765 1.473792 16.22
psi 0.825050 0.009314 88.58
zeta 6.148525 0.367133 16.75
sigma 1.109029 0.006406 173.12
kpy12 0.021856 0.012685 1.72
kwto12 3.779044 0.856993 4.41
kasn12 -5.066322 1.092780 4.64
kd122 -0.129911 0.002119 61.31
kd125 -14.315524 1.397140 10.25
kd129 -1.375834 0.552210 2.49
kd1213 -0.000790 0.111567 0.01
ks125 -4.013748 0.172884 23.22
kln122 -20.125697 0.476277 42.26
kln127 -15.615255 0.785055 19.89




nu12 1.725633 0.019815 87.09
rho 42.034629 1.496309 28.09
xi121 0.503374 0.042791 11.76
xi122 3.813806 0.024478 155.8
xi123 -0.269849 0.195289 1.38
xi124 0.940159 0.010294 91.33
xi125 0.747371 0.632065 1.18
xi126 -4.188879 0.853645 4.91
xi127 4.434972 0.402791 11.01
xi128 -1.346478 0.204601 6.58
xi129 0.679069 0.991601 0.68
xi1210 -2.894391 0.219088 13.21
xi1211 -0.978551 0.216474 4.52
xi1213 0.792762 0.115269 6.88
dl121 0.574730 0.007627 75.35
dl122 -1.310330 0.018323 71.51
dl123 -0.058154 0.172289 0.34
dl124 -1.112235 0.067673 16.44
dl125 -1.241559 0.367474 3.38
dl126 -0.493003 0.344350 1.43
dl127 -1.511200 0.085518 17.67
dl128 0.191707 0.056237 3.41
dl129 -2.446090 0.070409 34.74
dl1210 -1.534751 0.064370 23.84
dl1211 0.409795 0.095703 4.28
dl1213 -0.695813 0.045623 15.25
dis1212 0.306342 0.008405 36.45
FIGURE 39. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: TAIWAN
Log-Likelihood 3353.845
Norm of Gradient 0.000775
Condition Number of Hessian 50000000
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 2134.118
Market Access Effect 1.092891
Freeness of Trade ф(12,1) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(12,2) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(12,3) 0.949430
Freeness of Trade ф(12,4) 0.360483
Freeness of Trade ф(12,5) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(12,6) 0.674472
Freeness of Trade ф(12,7) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(12,8) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(12,9) 0.174389
Freeness of Trade ф(12,10) 0.045607
Freeness of Trade ф(12,11) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(12,13) 0.563701




gm131 -0.004424 0.004103 1.08
gm132 -0.001319 0.005223 0.25
gm133 -0.000726 0.003597 0.2
gm134 0.110289 0.597504 0.18
gm135 -0.003580 0.011183 0.32
gm136 1.456186 3.571509 0.41
gm137 -0.000979 0.001281 0.76
gm138 0.081373 0.021435 3.8
gm139 0.005079 0.027417 0.19
gm1310 0.618767 0.212310 2.91
gm1311 -0.000623 0.000523 1.19
gm1312 -0.026565 0.394159 0.07
eta -0.001739 0.000512 3.4
theta -6.131722 28.610990 0.21
psi 0.314120 1.737611 0.18
zeta 0.328632 0.125453 2.62
sigma 1.210542 0.103315 11.72
kpy13 -0.403779 0.245255 1.65
kwto13 0.608574 5.436758 0.11
kasn13 1.618989 4.699088 0.34
kd132 10.541372 69.775957 0.15
kd139 6.358750 24.450072 0.26
kd1311 -11.580662 7.544674 1.53
kd1312 0.206736 56.119549 0
ks132 -11.468706 13.179911 0.87
kf135 2.580433 0.863648 2.99




rho 6.445869 21.137583 0.3
xi131 34.252551 28.933476 1.18
xi132 -5.874924 17.104145 0.34
xi133 -12.097502 0.176274 68.63
xi134 2.153142 8.819378 0.24
xi135 4.259246 5.174257 0.82
xi136 0.473063 0.240736 1.97
xi137 -13.109641 3.135792 4.18
xi138 -3.286734 2.845341 1.16
xi139 5.025826 8.606187 0.58
xi1310 -0.647424 0.166719 3.88
xi1311 -15.892827 8.566551 1.86
xi1312 -2.199475 2.920596 0.75
dl131 -28.119882 20.660827 1.36
dl132 -4.259591 5.786900 0.74
dl133 -0.868097 0.560420 1.55
dl134 -2.847084 4.272436 0.67
dl135 -6.428340 0.459946 13.98
dl136 -1.309437 0.012547 104.36
dl137 -2.965393 0.402329 7.37
dl138 0.604551 0.605654 1
dl139 -0.321770 0.067531 4.76
dl1310 -0.532674 0.017495 30.45
dl1311 -0.519664 0.088086 5.9
dl1312 0.488289 0.068100 7.17
dt132 -0.592963 0.008490 69.85
dis1313 0.484776 0.004056 119.53
FIGURE 41. FIML REGRESSION
DIAGNOSTICS: VIETNAM
Log-Likelihood 1677.877
Norm of Gradient 0.001413
Condition Number of Hessian 76400000
Full Value of Log-Likelihood 458.1498
Market Access Effect 2.629809
Freeness of Trade ф(13,1) 2.065E-23
Freeness of Trade ф(13,2) 0.000104
Freeness of Trade ф(13,3) 0.244430
Freeness of Trade ф(13,4) 0.007736
Freeness of Trade ф(13,5) 0.000008
Freeness of Trade ф(13,6) 0.107527
Freeness of Trade ф(13,7) 0.011050
Freeness of Trade ф(13,8) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(13,9) 0.158340
Freeness of Trade ф(13,10) 0.440987
Freeness of Trade ф(13,11) 1
Freeness of Trade ф(13,12) 1
FIGURE 42: WAGE AND MA CORRELATION
Key Country Average Wages Raw Market Access Effect
1 Australia 96.251488 1.601298
2 China 86.21708 0.998874
3 Indonesia 83.62524 0.977892
4 India 94.894088 1.011403
5 Japan 101.07364 0.990152
6 Korea 83.16548 1.004261
7 Malaysia 93.0056 0.973169
8 New Zealand 97.78972 0.662545
9 Philippines 101.687958 0.931898
10 Singapore 85.74548 1.047220
11 Thailand 103.659176 1.216182
12 Taiwan 90.34 1.092891
13 Vietnam 78.153317 2.629809
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